Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History by Law, David S. & Zaring, David
William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 51 NO. 5, 2010
LAW VERSUS IDEOLOGY: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
DAVID S. LAW* & DAVID ZARING**
ABSTRACT
Much of the social science literature on judicial behavior has
focused on the impact of ideology on how judges vote. For the most
part, however, legal scholars have been reluctant to embrace empir-
ical scholarship that fails to address the impact of legal constraints
and the means by which judges reason their way to particular
outcomes. This Article attempts to integrate and address the concerns
* Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St.
Louis. B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Stanford University; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.C.L. in European
and Comparative Law, University of Oxford.
** Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Wharton School of Business. B.A., Swarthmore
College; J.D., Harvard Law School. © 2010, David S. Law & David Zaring. Preliminary
versions of this Article were presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association in Chicago; the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science
Association in Vancouver; the Conferences on Empirical Legal Studies held at Cornell Law
School in September 2008 and the University of Southern California in November 2009; the
2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston; and a junior
scholars workshop at American University. The authors are deeply grateful to Ryan Black
and Josh Fischman for invaluable methodological help. We also wish to thank Lawrence
Baum, James Brudney, Charles Cameron, Frank Cross, Michael Dorf, James Fowler, Dan
Ho, Jeff Lax, Paul Quirk, Anthony Stenger, Justin Wedeking, and Jeff Yates for their
thoughtful and perceptive suggestions, and to all those who attended our presentations of
this Article for their engaging feedback. Brianne Blakey, Dana Buckman, Nikki Cho, Samir
Mehta, and Chris Rogers provided patient and meticulous research assistance.
1653
1654 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1653
of both audiences by way of an empirical examination of the Supreme
Court’s use of a particular interpretive technique— namely, the use
of legislative history to determine the purpose and meaning of a
statute. We analyzed every opinion in every Supreme Court statutory
interpretation case from 1953 through 2006 that involved a fre-
quently interpreted federal statute. We also collected original data on
the characteristics of each statute, including its age, length, complex-
ity, obscurity, and the number of times that it had been amended. We
then used our data on these statutory characteristics—together with
information on the ideological tilt of the Justices, the case outcomes,
and the legislators who enacted the statute—in a logit regression
analysis to determine the relative impact of each variable on the
likelihood that a Justice would cite legislative history in a given
opinion. 
We find that the use of legislative history is driven by a combina-
tion of legal and ideological factors. On the whole, the legal variables
have a significantly larger impact on the likelihood of legislative
history usage than the ideological variables, but the impact of the
ideological variables cannot be dismissed. Statutes that are longer or
more complex increase the likelihood of legislative history usage,
whereas frequent amendment of a statute decreases that likelihood.
The age of the statute also matters, but its effect is neither linear nor
monotonic: very new and very old statutes are more likely to elicit
legislative history usage than statutes of intermediate age. Majority
opinions are significantly more likely to cite legislative history than
dissenting opinions, which in turn are more than twice as likely to
cite legislative history as concurring opinions. Our findings also
suggest that the use of legislative history by one Justice prompts
other Justices to respond in kind with legislative history arguments
of their own. We found no evidence, however, that the Court’s
adoption in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council of the
doctrine that reviewing courts should defer to reasonable agency
interpretations affected the overall propensity of the Justices to cite
legislative history.
With respect to the impact of ideological factors, liberal Justices
are generally more likely than conservative Justices to cite legislative
history. In addition, the Justices are more likely to consult legislative
history when they are ideologically sympathetic to the purposes of the
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enacting Congress. At the same time, however, legislative history
usage is not correlated with more ideological decision making.
Although the decision to use legislative history is influenced by
ideological factors, the actual use of legislative history does not make
it more likely that a Justice will arrive at his or her preferred
outcome. Moreover, contrary to what some scholars have suggested,
we also found no evidence that Justice Scalia has persuaded other
Justices to refrain from citing legislative history in their own
opinions. Rather, the decline in the overall use of legislative history
since the mid-1980s reflects a rightward shift in the ideological
composition of the Court, as liberal Justices who were inclined to cite
legislative history have been replaced by conservative Justices who
are not so inclined.
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INTRODUCTION
There are two principal, and conflicting, views as to why judges
turn to legislative history when interpreting statutes. One
view—often associated with Justice Scalia, but also consistent with
a wealth of judicial behavior literature that depicts judges as
ideological and strategic decision makers—is that they do so
cynically, as a means of securing for themselves the interpretive
flexibility they need to arrive at the substantive outcomes they
prefer.1 A different and long-popular view, which in recent years has
been most visibly championed by Justice Breyer, is that judges
should and do cite legislative history for the innocuous reason that
it is a useful aid to interpreting statutes that lack clear meaning.2 
Both views rest upon descriptive assertions about judicial
behavior that have, for the most part, gone untested. But it is not
simply the motivations behind legislative history usage that remain
shrouded in mystery. More generally, relatively little is known
empirically about the determinants of judicial opinion content and
the reasons for which judges employ particular materials and
techniques in the course of reaching their decisions.3 To what extent
does law matter, and to what extent does ideology matter? This
Article tackles these questions by way of an empirical analysis of
the reasons for which Supreme Court Justices have resorted to
legislative history over the last fifty years. We engage in the most
comprehensive examination of the Court’s use of legislative history
to date, in light of both the variety of explanations that we consider
and the range of data that we analyze. In the course of investigating
legislative history usage, we also study the formal and linguistic
characteristics of a broad range of federal statutes. The results of
our efforts to measure various substantive aspects of these statutes
in an objective manner may be of interest in their own right to many
scholars.
Our conclusion is that the Justices use legislative history for both
legal and ideological reasons, but the legal reasons are predominant.
1. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II.E.
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On the one hand, the Justices appear to resort to legislative history
partly for reasons having to do with the form and content of the
statutes themselves. In particular, they are more likely to consult
legislative history when faced with statutes of a certain age, level of
complexity, or degree of amendedness. On the other hand, the
propensity of Justices to cite legislative history is significantly
correlated with the ideology of the Justices themselves: liberal
Justices are more likely than conservative Justices to use it. In
addition, the fact that a Justice is of the same ideological bent as the
legislators who enacted the statute increases the likelihood that he
or she will turn to legislative history. At the same time, however,
the fact that a liberal Justice cites legislative history in a particular
opinion does not render it more likely that the opinion in question
will arrive at a liberal outcome.
Finally, we reject the oft-expressed hypothesis that Justice
Scalia’s vocal criticism of legislative history helps to explain the
overall decline in legislative history usage since the Burger Court.4
The decline is more likely attributable to the overall rightward shift
in the composition of the Court, for which no single Justice can be
assigned either credit or blame. Liberal Justices who were inher-
ently predisposed to use legislative history have, on the whole, been
replaced by conservative Justices who are not. Controlling for such
factors as the ideology of each Justice, we found no evidence that
Justice Scalia has influenced the legislative history usage of other
members of the Court.
     I. THE NORMATIVE DEBATE OVER THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE  
HISTORY
For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court embraced
the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation cases with
growing enthusiasm. From the 1930s to the 1980s, legislative
history appeared in the Court’s opinions with increasing frequency,
reaching a high of 450 citations in the 1974 term.5 It was during this
time that the Court came to adopt what is now the conventional
4. See infra Part II.D.
5. Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 297-306 (1982).
1660 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1653
view that “proper construction” of a statute “frequently requires
consideration of [the statute’s] wording against the background of
its legislative history and in the light of the general objectives
Congress sought to achieve.”6 In more recent years, the Court has
taken the opportunity to reaffirm that the practice of consulting
legislative history is deeply rooted and likely to endure into the
future.7 
The use of legislative history has long enjoyed influential
champions and friends on the bench,8 with perhaps none being more
visible today than Justice Breyer. To consider legislative history, he
has argued, is akin to “find[ing] out the purpose of an action taken
by a group” by “ask[ing] some of the group’s members about it”9:
given a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, it is sensible
and unobjectionable to consider legislative history.10 Nor, in his
view, must the use of legislative history be confined to discerning
the purpose of an enactment. It can also help judges to “avoid[ ] an
absurd result,” “explain[ ] specialized meanings,” “choos[e] among
reasonable interpretations of a politically controversial statute,” and
even “illuminate drafting errors … that courts should correct”11—as
the Court itself has demonstrated on various occasions.12
In recent decades, however, the use of legislative history has
occasioned a sharp and perhaps effective critique from influential
6. Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968).
7. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4 (1991) (“Our precedents
demonstrate that the Court’s practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its
past.... We suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.”).
8. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380,
386 (arguing that judges “cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools [such as legislative
history] which members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the
meaning of the words used in the statute”).
9. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845, 864-65 (1992).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 848-56. 
12. For controversial examples of the correction of drafting errors on the basis of
legislative intent, see Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s decision is nothing other than the elevation of judge-
supposed legislative intent over clear statutory text.”); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict
language, controls.”); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (“[I]n rare
cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.”).
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corners of the judiciary. Justice Scalia, in particular, has waxed
critical of the Court’s use of legislative history, which he has con-
demned in memorable terms as “that last hope of lost interpretive
causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction.”13 In
his view, legislative history materials provide “increasingly unre-
liable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually had
in mind,” and their use by the Court merely undermines the
“reasoned, consistent, and effective application” of federal law.14
But Justice Scalia is by no means the only prominent critic of
legislative history; nor are his criticisms the only criticisms. Some
have taken issue with the notion that legislative history is capable
of revealing legislative intent. Judge Easterbrook, for one, has
insisted that no such “intent” can be divined15: “The meaning of
statutes is to be found not in the subjective, multiple mind of
Congress,” he has argued, for the simple reason that a multimember
body such as Congress cannot formulate or act upon a single intent
as if it were a unitary entity.16 There is only a text, and to look to
Congress for further guidance is, in his view, unproductive.17
13. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 723 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Our obligation is to go as far in achieving the general congressional purpose as the text of
the statute fairly prescribes—and no further. We stop where the statutory language does, and
do not require explicit prohibition of our carrying the ball a few yards beyond.”).
14. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is neither
compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective
application of the statutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of
congressional intent, to give legislative force to each snippet of analysis, and even every case
citation, in committee reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what the voting
Members of Congress actually had in mind.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani,
523 U.S. 517, 535 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Accordingly, Easterbrook suggests that “[w]e should look at the statutory structure
and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user
of words.” Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65-66 (1988). Along these lines, a study of the aides that draft
legislation and legislative history concluded that “the standard judicial story of the legislative
drafting process may be flawed in important respects .... [T]here may be important
institutional differences between the judicial and legislative branches when it comes to the
values that shape the drafting process—differences we characterize in terms of ‘interpretive’
versus ‘constitutive’ virtues.” Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study,  77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (2002).
16. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 65.
17. See id. at 60-66. Judge Easterbrook’s position is directly opposed to that of Justice
Breyer, who has taken the position that one can in fact ascertain the intent and purpose of
a multimember body such as Congress, and that legislative history can help judges to achieve
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Others, meanwhile, have shared Justice Scalia’s suspicion that
legislative history helps judges to decide cases on the basis of their
“policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of law.”18 Judge
Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit famously likened the selective use of
legislative history by judges to “looking over a crowd and picking out
your friends.”19 That is to say, given the vast quantity and range of
legislative history materials from which they have to choose, it is all
too tempting for a judge to take only what is convenient—namely,
that which helps to achieve the desired result—and to ignore the
rest.20 Another former jurist has gone so far as to suggest a constitu-
tional problem with the use of legislative history. Building upon the
Court’s reasoning in INS v. Chadha,21 Kenneth Starr has argued
that ascertaining congressional intent by reference to materials
beyond the scope of the duly enacted statute is anathema to the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment found in Article I.22
To rely on statements that have neither been voted upon in both
that interpretive goal:
[O]ne can ascribe an “intent” to Congress in enacting the words of a statute if
one means “intent” in its, here relevant, sense of "purpose," rather than its sense
of “motive.” One often ascribes “group” purposes to group actions. A law school
raises tuition to obtain money for a new library. Obviously, one of the best ways
to find out the purpose of an action taken by a group is to ask some of the
group’s members about it.
Breyer, supra note 9, at 864-65.
18. Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s
2003-04 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 576 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
19. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal). 
20. If the use of legislative history is a way of picking out one’s friends in a crowd,
however, then the refusal to use legislative history might similarly be characterized as a
convenient way of avoiding one’s enemies. The nonuse of legislative history may be as useful
a tool for securing outcomes as its active use. Albert Lin has argued, for example, that the
Court’s increasing refusal to use legislative history in environmental cases has led to more
conservative outcomes: 
What makes textualism particularly troubling is that it allows judges to avoid
taking responsibility for these judgments by asserting claims of neutrality.
Notwithstanding suggestions that more moderate members of the Court ... have
turned back Justice Scalia’s efforts to establish textualism as the dominant
theory of statutory interpretation, the Court’s 2003-04 environmental docket
reflected a strong textualist influence. 
Lin, supra note 18, at 580-81.
21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
22. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.
371, 376; see also Mikva, supra note 8.
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houses of Congress nor signed by the President, he contends, is
tantamount to giving effect to legislative language that has not gone
through the required constitutional process of passage by both
houses of Congress and signature by the President.23 
In the face of these criticisms, the Court itself has, on occasion,
adopted a skeptical stance toward the use of legislative history.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, recently characterized
legislative history as “murky, ambiguous, and contradictory” and
emphasized that “the authoritative statement is the statutory text,
not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.”24 The
Court has also recently voiced concern that the use of legislative
history rewards strategic efforts by lobbyists to achieve by subter-
fuge what they could not achieve via the constitutionally ordained
legislative process.25 Hints and statements of this nature have
prompted some to conclude that “nowadays [legislative history] is
eschewed a bit more often than it is used.”26 
Nevertheless, the federal courts are far from eschewing the
practice completely. The Court itself made a point of proclaiming its
support for legislative history in the early Rehnquist-era case of
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, in which all of the Justices
except Justice Scalia signed onto a footnote that specifically
defended the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.27 Since
then, legislative history has hardly disappeared from the pages of
the United States Reports.28 What can also be found in those same
23. Starr, supra note 22, at 376.
24. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 
25. See id. (“[J]udicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are
not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee
members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive
to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable
to achieve through the statutory text.”).
26. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 131-32 (2000); see also
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story
of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1837-39 (1998) (espousing a critical view of
legislative history). 
27. 501 U.S. 597, 599, 610-12 n.4 (1991); id. at 621-23 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Indeed, following the Mortier decision, Jane Schacter found that the Court’s 1996 term
featured more citations to legislative history than did earlier terms. Jane S. Schacter, The
Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:
Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (1998)
(noting an increase in the Court’s use of legislative history during the 1996 term); see also,
e.g., Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The
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pages, however, is a public debate over its appropriateness.29 Not
surprisingly, given the mixed signals emanating from the Court,
that debate has spilled into the pages of the Federal Reporter as
well: the courts of appeals have expressed a growing range of views
on the value and role of legislative history.30
The ongoing debate over the use of legislative history shows no
signs of subsiding. At the same time, much is at stake: the embrace
or rejection of legislative history has the potential to shape not
only the outcomes that judges reach,31 but also the way in which
Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 395 (1999) (arguing that,
although “there has emerged a clear and unmistakable pattern of decline in the use of
legislative history by the Supreme Court ... it is premature to conclude that legislative history
will cease to be a tool of statutory interpretation”). Nor does it appear that Justice Scalia’s
critique has led to a substantial decline in the Court’s use of any particular type of legislative
history: its relative propensity to cite various types of congressional materials—from
committee reports to floor statements and hearing records—has remained constant, with
committee reports and congressional debates remaining the sources of legislative history most
likely to be consulted. See id. at 390.
29. A recent exchange between Justices Stevens and Scalia illustrates the current state
of affairs. Per Justice Stevens, “[a]nalysis of legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool
of statutory ‘construction’ that can make the purpose of a statute ‘pellucidly clear.’” Zuni Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia, in dissent, argued that “[l]egislative history can never produce a ‘pellucidly clear’
picture, of what a law was ‘intended’ to mean, for the simple reason that it is never voted
upon—or ordinarily even seen or heard—by the ‘intending’ lawgiving entity.” Id. at 117
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). For his part, Justice Scalia accused the
Court of using legislative history to reach a decision that could not have been justified by sole
reliance on the plain text of the statute. See id. at 108-09, 116. Yet Justice Stevens—and a
majority of his colleagues—remained unbowed. See id. at 89-93, 97, 100 (majority opinion);
id. at 104-07 (Stevens, J., concurring).
30. Compare, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1326 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“Although the snippets of legislative history are largely in accord with our reading of
the statutory text, we do not rely on them to shape our interpretation; the Supreme Court has
cautioned against such use of this kind of legislative history.”), with, e.g., Harding v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 448 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[S]ensible caution does not
prevent us from relying upon the remarks of the sponsor of legislation describing his purpose
in introducing that legislation as an indicator of Congressional intent, at least in the absence
of contradictory evidence in the legislative history.”), OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428
F.3d 583, 592 (6th Cir. 2005) (observing that a search of the statute’s legislative history might
be appropriate in cases of statutory ambiguity), and AD Global Fund, LLC v. United States,
67 Fed. Cl. 657, 676-77 (2005) (concluding that “[i]f a statute remains ambiguous even after
consideration of its plain meaning, a court may rely on legislative history to interpret the
meaning of the ambiguous terms,” but also noting that “[n]ot all legislative history is entitled
to equal regard,” and that “[t]he most persuasive sort of legislative history are the reports
from the committees that studied, drafted, and proposed the legislation”).
31. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Congress writes statutes. If we are to sort our way intelligently
through the arguments that have been made for and against the use
of legislative history, we must have a clear and empirically
grounded understanding of the actual reasons for which judges use
legislative history and the conditions under which they are most
likely to do so. A review of the relevant empirical literature reveals,
however, that we remain woefully far from enjoying such an
understanding. 
II. THE STATE OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
A. Trends in the Supreme Court’s Usage of Legislative History
over Time
There does not exist a large body of empirical research on legis-
lative history usage. To the extent that such literature does exist, it
has tended to focus, not surprisingly, upon the Supreme Court, and
much of it has sought simply to piece together trends in the Court’s
overall use of legislative history over time.32 The picture that
emerges from the existing research, moreover, is fragmentary and
at times contradictory. 
Scholars agree that, on the whole, the Court has made fairly
frequent use of legislative history. From the late nineteenth century
through the late twentieth century, it cited congressional reports in
approximately one-third of its statutory interpretation cases,
congressional debates in another 17%, and congressional hearings
in another 13% of cases.33 These aggregate statistics, however,
conceal significant differences across both time and areas of law.
With respect to variations by area of law, an early study by Beth
Henschen of the interpretive techniques employed by the Court in
labor and antitrust cases from 1950 through 1972 found that nearly
32. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355 & tbl.1, 356-67 (1994) (describing the decline in the Supreme Court’s
use of legislative history between 1981 and 1992); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and
Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 97-102 (1998) (contending that the Supreme Court rarely
used legislative history before the New Deal); Wald, supra note 19, at 195 (analyzing the
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history in the 1981 term).
33. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1992).
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all of the Justices were more likely to resort to legislative history in
the labor context than in the antitrust context.34
A handful of studies have sought to describe trends and patterns
in the Court’s use of legislative history over specific periods of time.
An early but informative effort by Carro and Brann evaluated the
Court’s use of legislative history from 1938 through 1979 and found
a “continual increase” over that period.35 A subsequent study by
Nicholas Zeppos of the Court’s use of “originalist sources other than
text” in statutory interpretation cases—a category of sources that
includes both “contemporaneous legislative history” and “the history
and circumstances of the time of enactment”—suggests that reliance
upon such sources waxed and waned dramatically over the twenti-
eth century.36 Charting the Court's citations to “[n]on-text[ ] original
sources” as a proportion of all citations found in its statutory
interpretation decisions, he reports that this proportion underwent
a sharp increase beginning in the early 1930s and peaking in the
mid-1940s, then experienced a gradual decline until approximately
1950.37 The proportion of citations to “[n]on-text[ ] [o]riginalist
[s]ources” rose precipitously to a peak in approximately 1980 before
plunging dramatically by approximately 1987 to lows not seen since
the 1930s.38 Zeppos also found evidence to suggest that textualist
34. Beth M. Henschen, Judicial Use of Legislative History and Intent in Statutory
Interpretation, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353, 360-62 & tbl.2 (1985) (finding legislative history cited
in 15% of antitrust and 38% of labor decisions in “222 cases in which the Supreme Court
interpreted federal labor and antitrust statutes in its 1950 through its 1972 terms”).
35. Carro & Brann, supra note 5, at 297-305 & tbl.I.
36. Zeppos, supra note 33, at 1104-05 & fig.7. Zeppos randomly selected twenty different
years from 1890 through 1990, then drew from each of those years a random sample of the
Court’s statutory interpretation decisions. See id. at 1088.
37. See id. at 1104-05 & fig.7.
38. See id. Michael Koby described a similar secular trend in the Court’s citations to
legislative history. He reports that, from 1980 to 1998, the Court’s citations to legislative
history fell from 479 to 79, a decrease of 85.5%. Koby, supra note 28, at 386-89. Although the
number of opinions declined from 156 to 94, this only accounted for a decrease of 39.74%,
which led Koby to conclude that the decline in use of legislative history was more dramatic.
See id. He found that, during the period before the appointment of Justice Scalia, from 1980
to 1986, there were a total of 1208 opinions and a total of 4193 legislative history citations,
which represented a ratio of 3.47 citations per opinion. Id. During the twelve-year period after
the appointment of Justice Scalia, he concluded that there was a total of 1493 opinions and
a total of 2720 legislative history citations, which represented a ratio of 1.87 citations per
opinion. Id. at 386-87. From 1995 to 1998, this ratio further decreased to 1.38 citations per
opinion. Id. at 387.
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analysis and reliance upon legislative history are complementary
approaches to statutory interpretation, rather than substitutes for
one another.39 References to the plain text of the statute were
positively correlated with citations to legislative history: the fact
that a particular opinion happened to cite the plain text of the
statute in question made it more, not less, likely that the opinion
would also reference legislative history.40
Other studies, however, have cast doubt upon the notion that
legislative history met its demise in the 1980s. In a pair of articles,
Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit evaluated the Supreme
Court’s legislative history usage during the 1980s, both before and
after Justice Scalia’s appointment.41 Examining the question
initially in 1983, she concluded that the Court had adopted the
habit of using legislative history in virtually every statutory
interpretation case, a development that she generally applauded.42
Revisiting the question as of the 1988 term, she praised the Court
for its ongoing and “substantive” reliance upon legislative history in
“almost three-fourths of [cases] involving statutory construction and
over one-third of all the opinions of the Court.”43 Judge Wald further
observed that, in most cases in which the Court did cite legislative
history, it did so either to support its textual analysis or to assure
itself that “legislative history simply disclosed nothing to contradict
or otherwise undermine the Court’s reading of the statute.”44 A later
study by Jane Schacter suggested that, by 1996, the use of legisla-
tive history was enjoying “some resurgence” among the Justices,
whereas the popularity of textualism, in the form of “citations to the
dictionary,” was in “apparent decline.”45 In that year, 49% of the
Court’s statutory interpretation majority opinions cited to legisla-
tive history; references to congressional committee reports, in
39. See Zeppos, supra note 33, at 1104-06, 1117-20.
40. See id. at 1104-06, 1118.
41. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 277, 277-29 (1990).
42. See Wald, supra note 19, at 197-98.
43. Wald, supra note 41, at 288 (emphasis omitted). But cf. Merrill, supra note 32, at 355-
57 (finding between 1981 and 1992 both an increase in textual analyses and a decrease in
references to legislative history).
44. Wald, supra note 41, at 289-90.
45. Schacter, supra note 28, at 5.
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particular, were “by far the leading source” of such citations.46
Schacter speculated that the addition of Justice Breyer to the Court
added impetus to the use of such materials.47 
B. Reasons for the Court’s Usage of Legislative History
Few scholars have attempted the difficult task of discerning the
Justices’ motives for citing legislative history, or of identifying the
reasons for which legislative history usage has varied over time and
across areas of law. Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s repeated
examinations of the Court’s use of legislative history in two specific
areas of law—employment and tax—are among the rare excep-
tions.48 In the employment law context, they found that the Justices
used legislative history for complex positional reasons, and that its
usage “as a whole is not distinctly ideological.”49 Throughout the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, legislative history was “as likely to
be invoked to help support pro-employee results as pro-employer
outcomes.”50 Indeed, Brudney and Ditslear noted the existence of a
“modest neutralizing effect,” wherein liberal Justices were actually
less likely to reach liberal outcomes when citing legislative history
than might otherwise have been expected.51 They also noted
specifically that the addition of Justices Scalia and Thomas to the
Court exacted a heavy toll on the Court’s use of legislative history:
the opinions written by Justices Scalia and Thomas explained
nearly one-half of the decline in overall legislative history usage by
46. Id. at 15.
47. See id. at 17 (positing also that textualism’s limitations may have become more
apparent during this time to the Justices).
48. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220,
229 (2006) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras]; James J. Brudney
& Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and
the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear,
Scalia Effect]; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58
DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Tax Law and Workplace Law].
49. Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 137.
50. Id.; Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 229 (noting
that “legislative history reliance for liberal workplace law statutes is associated with pro-
employer results more often than one might expect”).
51. Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 140 (internal quotations omitted).
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the Court since 1986.52 However, it is unclear to what extent their
findings can be generalized beyond the employment law context.
Indeed, Brudney and Ditslear themselves offered a variety of
reasons to think that employment law cases may be atypical.53 
Their subsequent comparison of the Court’s employment and tax
decisions confirmed that the prevalence of legislative history usage
varies across different areas of law.54 By way of a partial explana-
tion, they suggested the existence of what they called a “Blackmun
effect,”55 which refers to the disproportionate impact that a par-
ticular Justice with substantive expertise can have on the Court’s
interpretive practices. As the sole member of the Court with
extensive expertise in tax law, Justice Blackmun authored a
disproportionate number of the Court’s tax opinions during his
tenure and, in doing so, was not averse to examining legislative
history.56 Only after his departure did the Court’s use of legislative
history in tax cases decline significantly.57 Brudney and Ditslear
concluded that, “at least for a field perceived as tepid in terms of
ideology and also judicial interest, the Justices may be willing to
follow the interpretive example of a knowledgeable colleague.”58 
Brudney and Ditslear also concluded that legislative history
serves different purposes depending upon the area of law in
question.59 Tax law, they observed, is the product of a bipartisan,
highly technical, expertise-driven process.60 Citation to legislative
history in the tax context is accordingly driven by the Court’s desire
to “borrow expertise” from the legislative drafters.61 By contrast, in
the context of workplace law, legislative history is used for the more
typical purpose of shedding light upon the political bargains and
compromises that were struck in order to secure the passage of the
52. Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 222.
53. See Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 172.
54. See Brudney & Ditslear, Tax Law and Workplace Law, supra note 48, at 1253-55 &
tbl.1 (reporting that legislative history was cited with significantly greater frequency in tax
cases than in workplace law cases).
55. Id. at 1300, 1303, 1307-08, 1311.
56. See id. at 1270-75.
57. See id. at 1273-75, 1307-09.
58. Id. at 1311.
59. See id. at 1235-36, 1259-60, 1276.
60. See id. at 1246-47, 1276, 1280-83.
61. Id. at 1246-48, 1261-63, 1278-79, 1283.
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law in question.62 It is no coincidence, they suggested, that the
Justices were more likely to disagree over the meaning of legislative
history in employment cases than in tax cases.63 Disagreements over
the meaning of legislative history are more likely, they argued,
when it is used to shed light upon the nature of a political bargain,
as in the employment law context, than when it is used for the
purpose of drawing upon relatively technical and uncontroversial
expertise, as in the tax context.64
In contrast to the in-depth, issue-specific approach taken by
Brudney and Ditslear, a newly published book by Frank Cross on
the subject of statutory interpretation has tackled the full range of
the Court’s statutory interpretation practices across the entire legal
spectrum.65 Professor Cross analyzed a sample of more than 120
cases drawn from the total pool of statutory interpretation cases
decided by the Court from 1994 through 2002.66 His analysis
devoted considerable attention to the Court’s use of different
“interpretive methods,” including one that he calls “legislative
intent.”67 This category of interpretive tools includes not only
references to legislative history, but also explicit findings of textual
ambiguity, and inferences from congressional action or inaction in
response to judicial decisions.68 
The fact that his analysis focused upon the aggregate category of
“legislative intent” largely prevents the reader from drawing
conclusions about the Court’s use of legislative history in particular.
Cross did, however, address the specific question of whether the
Justices cite legislative history for ideological or strategic reasons.
He hypothesized that “liberal” Justices may be willing to “make
greater use of less reliable sources” of legislative history “when
necessary to support a liberal outcome.”69 Cross ultimately found no
62. See id. at 1260-62, 1276.
63. See id. at 1264-65 & tbl.5 (reporting that legislative history is more likely to be
invoked by both the majority and dissenting opinions in nonunanimous workplace law cases
than in nonunanimous tax cases).
64. See id.
65. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009).
66. Id. at 142-43.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 143.
69. Id. at 171 (characterizing, inter alia, conference committee reports as a more “reliable”
source of legislative history than statements by the sponsors of a bill); see also WILLIAM N.
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support for this hypothesis: concluding that usage of “less reliable”
sources by “liberal” Justices was not associated with a greater
likelihood of reaching liberal results.70 Nor did he find evidence of
result-oriented, instrumental usage of legislative history by “conser-
vative” Justices71: to the contrary, “liberal” and “conservative”
Justices alike were more likely to reach liberal results when they
made use of legislative history.72
 
C. Legislative History Usage by the Lower Federal Courts
Not all of the empirical literature on the use of legislative history
has focused exclusively on the Supreme Court. In a recent article,
Professors Abramowicz and Tiller examined citations by lower court
judges to a particular form of legislative history—namely, state-
ments by legislators that are included in the Congressional Record.73
They found that judges appointed by Republican presidents cited to
the Congressional Record with approximately the same frequency
as did Democratic appointees.74 Intriguingly, however, they also
found that judges appointed by either party were significantly
more likely to cite politicians of the party that appointed a majority
of judges on the circuit court responsible for reviewing their
decisions.75 Thus, for example, both Democratic and Republican
appointees exhibited a significant tendency to cite the statements
of Democratic lawmakers if they knew that their decisions would be
reviewed by a circuit court dominated by Democratic appointees,
and to cite the statements of Republican lawmakers if they knew
that their decisions would be reviewed by a circuit court dominated
by Republican appointees.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 fig.7.1 (1994) (depicting a
“[h]ierarchy of legislative history sources”).
70. CROSS, supra note 65, at 171-72. Cross categorized Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Stevens as “liberal” but did not expressly list the “conservative” Justices. Id.
71. Id. at 172.
72. Id.
73. Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical
Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making, 38 J.
LEGAL STUD. 419, 427-28 (2009).
74. See id. 
75. See id.
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Professor Cross’s wide-ranging book on statutory interpretation
also addressed the use of legislative history by the circuit courts,
albeit not at great length.76 On the basis of an electronic search for
circuit court references to “legislative history” over the last thirty
years, he reported that such references increased dramatically from
1980 through 1992 before declining in equally dramatic fashion.77
Cross considered, and rejected, the possibility that the decrease in
legislative history usage is attributable to the increasingly conserva-
tive composition of the circuit courts themselves: he notes that the
increase in references to legislative history occurred at a time when
the circuit courts were themselves becoming more conservative.78
Nor has the overall decline in legislative history usage been offset
by a shift to “more reliable” sources of legislative history: citations
to conference committee reports, he observes, have declined in
conformity with the overall trend.79
D. Scholarly Assessment of the Impact of Justice Scalia on   
Legislative History Usage
To the extent that the existing literature on judicial use of
legislative history contains a recurring theme, it is that the critiques
leveled by Justice Scalia and other prominent jurists have exacted
a heavy toll on the willingness of judges to cite legislative history.
In particular, scholars have found repeatedly that a decline in the
Supreme Court’s overall use of legislative history roughly coincided
with Justice Scalia’s appointment.80 Legislative history usage
declined even more dramatically in the circuit courts following his
appointment, albeit with a six-year lag.81 Professors Brudney and
Ditslear put the point bluntly: “Justice Scalia has played an
76. See CROSS, supra note 65, at 184-85.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 186.
79. Id. at 185.
80. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 69, at 227 fig.7.2 (comparing the relative frequency with
which the Court considered “legislative history” and “plain meaning” from 1986 through 1991,
and concluding that the Court has been “somewhat more willing to find a statutory plain
meaning and less willing to consult legislative history” since Justice Scalia’s appointment);
Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 222-24; Koby, supra note
28, at 386-87.
81. See CROSS, supra note 65, at 185.
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important role in the Court’s declining use of this resource—both
through high profile resistance and criticism expressed in his own
opinions, and through the influence he seems to have had on the
writings of his colleagues.”82
E. Two Overarching Weaknesses of the Judicial Behavior     
Literature
The weaknesses of the empirical literature on legislative history
are not unique but rather reflect those of the empirical literature on
judicial behavior as a whole. There are two such weaknesses in
particular that are worthy of note. The first is a general lack of
either theoretical or empirical understanding as to why judges use
particular types of arguments. Although statistical analyses of
judicial voting patterns and case outcomes are increasingly common,
empirical analysis of the content of judicial opinions remains
relatively rare.83 Empirical studies of the reasons for which judges
employ certain analytical techniques or justify their decisions in
particular ways are rarer still and do not add up to a programmatic
body of scholarship.84
82. Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 229; see also
Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 162 (arguing that “Justice Scalia’s
regularly voiced absolutist stance has had an impact over time”).
83. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 266-68 (2006)
(criticizing much of the political science literature for, inter alia, focusing on the analysis of
bare outcomes in lieu of the content of opinions); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007) (noting that “large-scale studies of judicial decisionmaking
generally lack ... a satisfactory account of the law” as an “independent normative force”); Kirk
A. Randazzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of Congressional Statutes on
Judicial Behavior, 68 J. POL. 1006, 1008-09 (2006) (noting the lack of empirical studies that
attempt to examine the impact of “traditional legal concepts” on judicial behavior) (quoting
Donald R. Songer & Susan B. Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of
Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 979
(1992)); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal
Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 885 (2008) (reviewing FRANK
B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)) (urging empirical scholars
to turn “toward examining and classifying the content of judicial opinions rather than merely
counting outcomes in cases”).
84. See, e.g., Pamela Corley et al., The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of
the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 335-36 (2005) (identifying empirically a number
of reasons for which the Justices cite the Federalist Papers); James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas
G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Incorporation and Interpretation of Precedent, 36 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 139, 140, 154 (2002) (finding empirical evidence that both the ideology of the
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In the arena of statutory interpretation, for example, we do not
know what characteristics of a statute, if any, increase the likeli-
hood that the Justices will resort to legislative history. Likewise, it
remains unclear whether legislative history is used for instrumen-
tal, ideologically motivated reasons, or a more benign view of the
reasons for which judges use legislative history is warranted.
Similar questions can be asked about what leads judges to use or
reject specific analytical approaches in other contexts. One might
ask why they embrace or spurn the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the area of administrative law, for example, or why they might
adopt balancing analyses as opposed to bright-line rules in the area
of criminal procedure.
A second overarching weakness of the literature is the extent to
which it has focused upon ideological explanations of judicial
behavior to the exclusion of legal explanations.85 The responsibility
for this state of affairs is, in all likelihood, widely shared. Political
scientists have been criticized for lacking the substantive legal
sophistication to devise appropriate hypotheses and test them in an
appropriate manner.86 Notwithstanding how quick they have
sometimes been to criticize the work that political scientists have
produced, however, legal scholars have yet to fill this void, for
reasons that are not difficult to divine. Many remain handicapped
Justices and considerations of stare decisis influence the likelihood that the Court will cite
or accord negative treatment to a particular precedent).
85. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895,
1904-07 (2009) (acknowledging the formidable “methodological challenges” involved in the
empirical study of appellate decision making, and urging scholars to employ methods and
analyses that address the impact of legal and deliberative factors); Friedman, supra note 83,
at 271 (arguing that it has become “old hat” to demonstrate that ideology influences judicial
decisions, and that it is necessary to develop “a more balanced picture” that incorporates legal
factors); Mark Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305 (2002) (noting that “[s]cholars have
marshaled impressive evidence” regarding the “political” aspects of judicial behavior but have
largely neglected the “jurisprudential” aspects); Sisk, supra note 83, at 884 (calling for
empirical scholars to dedicate more effort to identifying the impact of “legal factors and legal
reasoning” on judicial decision making); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in
Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 687-89 (2009) (charging that “[t]he
judicial politics field was born in a congeries of false beliefs” that have “warped its orientation
and development,” and that it remains characterized by a “distorting slant” that leads
scholars “to exaggerate the influence of politics in judging”).
86. See sources cited supra note 83.
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by a lack of familiarity with empirical methodology, to the point that
the very term “methodology” is a mainstay of the social science
lexicon yet remains alien to the typical law professor.87 One also
cannot rule out the possibility that many legal scholars harbor the
view, consciously or otherwise, that legal argument is an art that
fundamentally cannot be quantified, and that an accurate under-
standing of the ways in which judges argue their way to particular
outcomes can only be acquired on an impressionistic basis by
sophisticated legal observers of long experience and nuanced judg-
ment. 
III. THE DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL OPINION CONTENT: THEORIES
AND HYPOTHESES
There are a number of possible explanations for the judicial use
of legislative history. In this Part, we state these explanations in the
form of empirically testable hypotheses, which we proceed to test
below. Our goal in articulating and defining these hypotheses was
not simply to answer the specific question of why Justices cite
legislative history, however, but also to articulate a theoretical
framework for addressing the weaknesses of the judicial behavior
literature as a whole.88 Accordingly, our hypotheses emphasize legal
and deliberative as well as ideological factors and are framed in
sufficiently general terms that they might be used to investigate
why judges employ other types of arguments or analytical tech-
niques in their opinions.
87. See, e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 85, at 1904-07 (acknowledging the
“methodological challenges” involved in the empirical study of appellate decision making); Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6, 9 & n.22 (2002) (noting
that “[t]he sustained, self-conscious attention to the methodology of empirical analysis so
present in the journals in traditional academic fields … is virtually nonexistent in the nation’s
law reviews,” and suggesting that “[l]ack of training may be the primary reason” for the
chronic failure of law professors to produce empirical scholarship that satisfies basic social
science standards); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 331-33 (1989) (identifying a host of reasons for which law professors
fail to produce empirical work, including a lack of relevant training).
88. See supra Part II.E.
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A. The Inherent Difficulty of the Legal Question: The Guidance-
Seeking Hypothesis
All other things being equal, we might expect the Justices to
resort to a wider range of techniques and authorities when faced
with objectively difficult legal questions that cannot be resolved
using a more limited set of tools. In the particular context of
statutory interpretation, difficult legal questions are posed by
statutes that are, in some objective sense, difficult to interpret. A
statute might be difficult to interpret if, for example, it is especially
complex or voluminous, or if it is antiquated and its meaning has
been obscured by the passage of time. So too might a statute with
which the Court has no prior experience, or one that is constantly
being amended, such that the Court is constantly faced with novel
questions of meaning. In other words, statutes that are inherently
difficult to interpret ought to drive the Justices to make greater use
of a broader range of interpretive tools and resources, including
legislative history. We call this prediction the guidance-seeking
hypothesis.
B. The Purpose and Function of the Opinion: The Precedent-
Crafting Hypothesis
The likelihood that a Justice will cite legislative history in an
opinion may depend to some degree upon the purpose that the
opinion is being designed to serve. More specifically, legislative
history usage may be motivated by the demands of legal craftsman-
ship inherent in constructing precedent that will provide adequate
guidance in future cases. A comprehensive account of the legislative
intent behind a statute, including discussion of the legislative
history, may increase the precedential value of an opinion by
anticipating and addressing future questions about the meaning of
the statute. 
If this argument is correct, then we should expect majority
opinions to cite legislative history at a greater rate than either
concurring or dissenting opinions. Because they are establishing
precedent, the authors of majority opinions ought to feel a greater
need to cover all relevant bases and hold themselves to a higher
2010] LAW VERSUS IDEOLOGY 1677
standard of thoroughness than the authors of minority opinions. By
contrast, a Justice who is writing merely to express reservations,
disagreement, or other reactions in the form of a concurrence or
dissent need not author an opinion that performs these functions
and may even be able to take it for granted that any necessary
acknowledgment or discussion of the legislative history can be found
in the majority opinion. We call this prediction the precedent-
crafting hypothesis. 
C. The Effect of Precedent: The Jurisprudential-Regime       
Hypothesis
Another explanation for the content of judicial opinions is that
judges may be bound by precedent to employ, or refrain from
employing, a particular approach. Professors Richards and Kritzer
use the term “jurisprudential regime” to describe a judicially self-
imposed structure that is designed to guide subsequent decision
making by identifying the relevant factors to be considered or the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied in future cases.89 The
existence of a jurisprudential regime that requires judges to use or
avoid a particular technique or device, such as legislative history,
ought to have an impact on the extent to which judges actually use
that approach. The hypothesis that judges write their opinions in a
particular way because they are required to do so by precedent
might be labeled the jurisprudential-regime hypothesis.
In the context of legislative history, one might think that the
Court’s landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council 90 constitutes a relevant jurisprudential regime.
Unfortunately, even if Chevron is rightly understood as bearing on
the propriety of legislative history usage, it is difficult to say with
certainty what the impact of the decision ought to be. The conven-
tional understanding of Chevron is that it prescribes a two-step
analysis for reviewing agency interpretations of federal statutes. In
the first step, the reviewing court is supposed to determine whether
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”91 If
89. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 85, at 305-06.
90. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
91. Id. at 842.
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not, the second step of the analysis directs the reviewing court to
defer to the agency’s construction of the statute as long as it is
“reasonable.”92 One view of Chevron would be that it ought to curtail
the use of legislative history. Step two of the Chevron analysis, it
might be argued, adopts a rule of deference that would seem to
obviate or even preclude resort to legislative history: as long as the
agency has behaved reasonably, there should be no occasion for the
reviewing court to consider legislative history. Another view of
Chevron, however, would be that it actually encourages reviewing
courts to consider legislative history. Chevron itself appears to
demonstrate that the correct way to determine at step one of the
analysis whether Congress has spoken to a particular question, or
to assess at step two whether the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable, is to examine the legislative history.93 
A majority of the cases in our data concerned, directly or directly,
an agency interpretation of a federal statute. Accordingly, if it is
true that jurisprudential regimes change the way in which opinions
are written, it should not surprise us to observe a different pattern
of legislative history usage in post-Chevron opinions than in pre-
Chevron opinions. 
D. The Dynamics of Disagreement: The Outcome-Justifying and
Tit-for-Tat Hypotheses
Judicial opinion writing frequently assumes the character of open
debate. It is normal, if not almost obligatory, for a dissenting
opinion to directly criticize the arguments made in a majority
opinion, and vice versa. Judges are expected to defend their own
arguments and conclusions and to rebut the arguments made by
their opponents. Failure to do so can reasonably be construed as
evidence of the weakness of one’s position, if not also a degree of
intellectual laziness. One might therefore expect that a Justice’s
92. Id. at 843-44.
93. See id. at 851-53 (examining the legislative history for evidence that Congress had a
specific meaning in mind when it employed the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act
Amendments); id. at 862-64 (analyzing the legislative history to determine whether EPA
regulations constituted a “reasonable” interpretation of the statutory language); see also
Merrill, supra note 32, at 353 (arguing that step one of the Chevron analysis calls for courts
to discern the “intentions” of the legislature by examining the legislative history).
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willingness to make a particular type of argument, such as one
based on legislative history, will depend in part upon what other
members of the Court have argued. 
There are two ways in which the dynamics of disagreement might
influence legislative history usage. First, disagreement over the
meaning of a statute may drive the Justices to reach for a greater
range of tools, including legislative history, both to bolster their own
conclusions and to undermine the conclusions of others. In other
words, if Justice X and Justice Y disagree over the meaning of a
statute, the mere fact that they disagree ought to increase the
likelihood that each of them will cite legislative history. We call this
possibility the outcome-justifying hypothesis. If it is correct, then we
would expect to see greater legislative history usage in nonunan-
imous decisions than in unanimous decisions.
Second, a Justice may feel compelled to respond to arguments of
a particular type by making a countervailing argument of the exact
same type. Let us call this possibility the tit-for-tat hypothesis. If
Justice X cites legislative history in support of his conclusion, the
tit-for-tat hypothesis predicts that Justice X’s use of legislative
history will prompt Justice Y to fight fire with fire by fashioning a
legislative history argument of his or her own.94 If this hypothesis
is correct, then the likelihood that a given opinion will cite legisla-
tive history ought to rise with the number of other opinions in the
same case that cite legislative history. 
E. The Impact of Ideology: Sincere Versus Instrumental       
Ideological Behavior
Needless to say, legal and deliberative factors alone may not
adequately explain the content of judicial opinions or the Court’s
statutory interpretation practices. Political scientists have long
emphasized the impact of ideology on judicial behavior.95 There are
a number of ways in which ideology might influence legislative
94. See Corley et al., supra note 84, at 335-36 (hypothesizing, and finding “very strong
evidence” of a “dueling citations” dynamic wherein an effort by one Justice to “lay claim to
the framers’ intent” by citing the Federalist Papers drives other Justices to make similar
efforts).
95. See sources cited supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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history usage in particular. For analytical purposes, it may be
especially useful to draw a distinction between sincere and instru-
mental ideological behavior. 
1. The Sincere Ideological Behavior Hypothesis
A simple possibility is that liberal Justices sincerely like to cite
legislative history, whereas conservative Justices are sincerely
averse to doing so. In other words, liberals may be ideologically
inclined to use legislative history regardless of whether it helps
them to reach liberal results, whereas conservatives may be
ideologically inclined to shun legislative history even when it might
help them to reach conservative results.
It might be objected that a Justice’s views on the propriety of
legislative history are more accurately characterized as a matter of
judicial philosophy or jurisprudential approach than as a reflection
of political ideology.96 If we were to find empirically, however, that
conservative Justices systematically shun legislative history while
liberal Justices systematically embrace it, such a finding would cast
at least some doubt upon the notion that a Justice’s stance toward
legislative history can be neatly separated from his or her ideology.
It would suggest instead that holding a particular attitude toward
the use of legislative history may simply be part of what it means
for a Justice to be ideologically liberal or conservative. 
2. The Instrumental Use Hypothesis
As noted previously, critics of legislative history have long voiced
the suspicion that the use of legislative history enables judges to
reach the results that they prefer on policy or ideological grounds.97
This argument rests upon two assumptions. First, it assumes that
legislative history is highly manipulable, in the sense that it is
always possible for judges to find legislative history that supports
96. See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should
We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 139-40 (2009) (discussing the difficulty involved
in classifying a preference for a particular “interpretive method” or the adoption of a
particular “judicial philosophy” as either “legal” or “ideological” in character).
97. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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whatever conclusion they would like to reach.98 Second, it assumes
that judges exploit this manipulability in ideologically motivated
ways. If these assumptions are true, then we might expect to see a
pattern of liberal Justices arriving at more liberal outcomes and
conservative Justices arriving at more conservative outcomes
whenever legislative history is cited.
To date, scholars have found little systematic evidence to support
this hypothesis. Indeed, their findings appear to suggest the
opposite.99 In this Article, we test this hypothesis anew on the basis
of more comprehensive data, while employing a broader set of
control variables.
3. The Ideological Alignment Hypothesis 
Another possibility is that judges are more likely to make use of
legislative history when the legislative history is inherently
favorable to the conclusion that they wish to reach. For example,
one might expect the legislative history of a civil rights statute to
demonstrate a more liberal animating purpose than that of a statute
limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction. If so, then reliance upon
legislative history ought to produce different ideological results
depending upon the statute at issue: it should promote a more
liberal outcome when the Court is interpreting a civil rights statute
and a more conservative outcome when it is interpreting a
jurisdiction-stripping statute.100 A liberal Justice might therefore
choose to use legislative history only when interpreting the civil
rights statute, whereas a conservative Justice might do so only
when interpreting the jurisdiction-stripping statute. To frame the
hypothesis in more general terms, the Justices should be more likely
98. See Wald, supra note 19, at 214 (quoting Judge Leventhal’s observation that the use
of legislative history is akin to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”). 
99. Professor Cross finds that both liberal and conservative Justices are more likely to
reach liberal results when using legislative history, see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying
text, while Professors Brudney and Ditslear report that, in the employment law context, the
use of legislative history by liberal Justices is correlated with more conservative results, see
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
100. Cf. Lin, supra note 18, at 580-81 (arguing that the Court’s failure to consult legislative
history when interpreting environmental statutes has led to more conservative outcomes).
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to cite legislative history when their own ideological preferences are
aligned with those of the Congress that enacted the statute at issue. 
F. The Possibility of Intellectual Leadership: The “Scalia Effect”
Hypothesis
Previous studies have promoted the conventional wisdom that
Justice Scalia has succeeded, perhaps singlehandedly, at discourag-
ing his colleagues from using legislative history.101 This conclusion
appears to be based largely on the fact that Justice Scalia’s appoint-
ment to the Court coincided with an overall decline in legislative
history usage on the Court.102 In order to test correctly for the
existence of a “Scalia effect” on other members of the Court,
however, it is necessary to control for the effect of other highly
relevant variables, such as the increasing conservatism of the
Court’s overall membership, or the fact that Justice Scalia himself
is responsible for authoring many of the opinions that fail to cite
legislative history.103 Our data enables us to control for precisely
these variables while testing for the existence of a “Scalia effect.”104
Whether Justice Scalia has discouraged legislative history usage
is relevant to the larger question of his overall influence on other
members of the Court, which remains the subject of considerable
interest and speculation. Lawrence Baum observes, for example,
that Justice Scalia’s “personal style ... seem[s] likely to reduce his
101. See supra Part II.D.
102. See supra Part II.D.
103. See Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 222 (reporting
that Justices Scalia and Thomas alone have been responsible for nearly one-half of the decline
in legislative history usage in the Court’s employment law decisions since 1986).
104. The “Scalia effect” that is the subject of our hypothesis—namely, the possibility that
Justice Scalia has succeeded at discouraging other Justices from using legislative history—is
distinct from the more complicated “Scalia Effect” hypothesized by Professors Brudney and
Ditslear. Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 122. They raise the possibility
that strategic behavior may create an illusion that liberal Justices cite legislative history in
order to reach liberal results. Liberal Justices, they argue, may strategically refrain from
citing legislative history when they reach pro-employer results in order to win Justice Scalia’s
support, but these same liberal Justices have no reason to refrain from citing legislative
history when they are reaching pro-employee results that are unlikely to secure Justice
Scalia’s support regardless of what interpretive methodology is used. The result, they suggest,
is that liberal Justices may appear to use legislative history in result-oriented ways when, in
fact, they may be adjusting their opinion-writing approaches in an effort to garner Justice
Scalia’s support. See id.
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influence,” and that his “behavior sometimes creates frictions with
other Justices.”105 The “best example” of the “substantial influence”
that Justice Scalia nevertheless exercises, according to Baum, is the
support that he has supposedly been able to attract for his views on
legislative history.106 Thus, were it to emerge that Justice Scalia has
failed to influence other members of the Court on what is clearly one
of his signature issues, such a finding would bode poorly for the
view that Justice Scalia is an effective intellectual leader on the
Court.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
A. Data on the Opinions
We sought to compile a far-reaching and comprehensive data set
that would enable us to tackle all of our hypotheses about the
Court’s usage of legislative history. To that end, we began by
identifying all Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases decided
from the 1953 term through the 2006 term. We isolated these cases
using the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database created
by Harold Spaeth, which includes variables that indicate whether
a case involved statutory interpretation and, if so, what statute was
at issue.107 Although the manner in which some of these variables
are coded has come under increasing scholarly criticism,108 the
105. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 136 (9th ed. 2006).
106. Id.
107. The Spaeth database may be downloaded from the Judicial Research Initiative (JuRI)
website at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm.
108. See, e.g., Fischman & Law, supra note 96, at 161-62 (canvassing recent criticisms of
the manner in which the Spaeth database purports to measure judicial ideology); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 775, 776-78 (2009) (criticizing, and seeking to correct, the Spaeth database’s coding
of the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity:
Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 477, 488-530
(2009) (arguing that scholars who wish to rely upon the variables relating to substantive law
in the Spaeth database face two problems: “(1) the impossibility of knowing how many (and
which) legal issues arise in a particular case and (2) the difficulty of using the Database to
study the way different areas of law interact with or affect each other”); Anna Harvey, What
Makes a Judgment “Liberal”?: Coding Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial
Database (June 15, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120970 (questioning the
Spaeth database’s coding of the ideological direction of Supreme Court statutory
interpretation decisions).
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Spaeth database is unsurpassed in comprehensiveness and scope
and remains the standard source of raw data for empirical analysis
of the Court’s decisions.109 
From the initial universe of the 2723 cases that we identified in
this manner, we then narrowed the data by focusing on statutes
that are interpreted with some frequency by the Court. Specifically,
we limited our analysis to cases involving statutes that were
interpreted by the Court nine or more times over the period in
question. Our decision to budget our finite time and resources in
this manner, rather than to analyze a random sample of statutes,
was guided by two considerations. On the one hand, the nature of
our project required us to generate a wealth of unique data on the
statutes that we analyzed, and information about statutes that are
most often the subject of controversy is surely of greater interest
and value to the legal and academic communities than information
about a random sampling of potentially obscure statutes. 
On the other hand, we were mindful of the possibility that, in
selecting statutes for analysis on the basis of how often they had
been interpreted, we might inadvertently introduce a selection bias
into our results: if the causes of legislative history usage happen to
be correlated with how often a statute is interpreted, then the study
of only frequently interpreted statutes can yield a misleading
picture of the causes of legislative history usage.110 These concerns
are perhaps assuaged, however, by our finding that the Justices do
not appear to approach infrequently interpreted statutes any
differently than they approach frequently interpreted ones. In
particular, we found no evidence that the Justices are either more
or less predisposed to consult legislative history when interpreting
a statute for the first time.111 There is no statistically significant
109. See Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
783, 812 (2003) (“The Spaeth databases are so dominating in [political science] that it would
certainly be unusual for a refereed journal to publish a manuscript whose data [about the
Supreme Court] derived from an alternate source. Even in the law reviews, virtually no
empirical study of the U.S. Supreme Court produced by political scientists fails to draw on
them.”).
110. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 128-38 (1994) (discussing the problem of selection bias and the
various forms that it can take).
111. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (setting forth the hypothesis that the
novelty of a statute affects the likelihood of legislative history usage, and describing how
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correlation between the fact that the Court has previously inter-
preted a statute and the likelihood that a Justice will use legislative
history when interpreting that statute. This is the case, moreover,
regardless of whether one controls for other variables that do have
a significant impact on legislative history usage.
The forty statutes that met the criterion of relatively frequent
interpretation ran the entire gamut of federal law.112 The most
frequently interpreted statute of all—if one can indeed call it a
statute, as opposed to an ongoing agglomeration of enactments—
was the Internal Revenue Code, which was the subject of some 373
separately authored opinions over the study period. The least
frequently interpreted statute among this group was the Clean Air
Act, which barely made the nine-case cutoff. This culling of the data
left us with 1479 cases, which in turn yielded 3095 individually
authored opinions for analysis.113 Relying again upon the informa-
tion in the Spaeth database, we identified each of these opinions as
a majority opinion, a regular concurrence, a special concurrence
(meaning agreement with the disposition but not the reasoning of
the Court), or a dissent.114
Each opinion was then coded with a variable indicating whether
the opinion made any reference at all to the legislative history of the
statute under consideration.115 Our goal was to identify any and all
references in these opinions to legislative history, ranging from the
House and Senate reports that accompany legislation to floor
debates and the Congressional Record. To do so, we searched the
opinions electronically for terms or citations commonly associated
with the use of legislative history.116 Our search string expanded
novelty was measured for purposes of empirical testing); infra tbl.6 (reporting logit regression
results indicating that novelty is not a statistically significant predictor of legislative history
usage).
112. See infra app. III & tbls.1-3 (listing the relevant statutes).
113. Excluded from this total are seven per curiam opinions, which by definition cannot be
attributed to a particular Justice.
114. A very small number of opinions—ten dissents from denial of certiorari, and one
jurisdictional dissent—fell into none of these categories.
115. We also excerpted the portion of the opinion citing legislative history for review by
other coders and conducted intercoder reliability tests.
116. Specifically, we searched the opinion, as set forth in Westlaw’s SCT database, for the
following terms. Although Westlaw is not case-sensitive, it was necessary to employ some
redundant search terms to ensure that spacing discrepancies did not cause us to miss any
references to legislative history: “legislative report!” “legislative history” “committee report”
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upon similar strings used in prior research on judicial use of
legislative history.117 Each of the opinions flagged by the electronic
search was then read multiple times to confirm that each apparent
reference to legislative history was genuine and did in fact relate to
the statute at issue, as identified by the Spaeth database.118 We
found that 1482 of the opinions, or 47.9%, contained some reference
to the legislative history of the statute in question. We also sought
to track the extent to which the Justices may have used legislative
history in response to its use by other Justices. This we did simply
by noting, for each opinion, whether any other opinion in the same
case had made some reference to legislative history.
It is possible that our electronic search may not have caught every
single reference to legislative history. Citations to testimony before
a congressional committee would only have been captured if the
opinion referred to the usual records of congressional business, such
as the United States Congressional and Administrative News or
committee hearings, or if the opinion itself characterized the
testimony as legislative history. Some opinions may have referred
to legislative history without necessarily citing it in such a manner.
Furthermore, we relied upon the Court’s citation practices to be
relatively consistent with the practices outlined in the Bluebook.119
“u.s.c.c.a.n.” “floor debate” “committee statement” “committee hearing” “legislative counsel”
“h.r.” “s.j. res.” “cong. rec.” “s. res.” “h.r.j. res.” “s. doc. no.” “s. rep.” “usccan” “cong.rec.”
“s.rep.no.” “h.r.rep.no.” “s.rep. no.” “h.r.rep. no.” “house report” “senate report” “admin. news”
“admin.news” “senate committee” “house committee” “h. r. rep.” “sess.” “conf.” “leg. hist.”
“leg.hist.”
117. For an example of the work that informed the selection of our search terms, see Jason
J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of
Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 862 n.95 (2006). Professors Abramowicz and Tiller
simply searched for references to the Congressional Record. See Abramowicz & Tiller, supra
note 73, at 427. Older studies, such as that of Professor Zeppos, did not rely upon electronic
searches at all. See Zeppos, supra note 33, at 1088.
118. All opinions in all cases identified by our electronic search as containing references
to legislative history were examined twice, first by a team of research assistants under the
supervision of Professor Zaring and then again by a team of law students under the
supervision of Professor Law.
119. Accordingly, if the Court cited to legislative history in an unconventional way, and did
not refer to the congressional activity as “legislative history” or something like it, we may
have missed it. This concern arises partly because of the large and comprehensive nature of
our data set. The fact that our data spans several decades enabled us to evaluate whether the
use of legislative history by the Court has increased or decreased over time, at least with
respect to statutes that are interpreted with some regularity. However, because citation
practices have become more formal and consistent over time, and accordingly more likely to
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Underinclusiveness is a risk inherent to all electronic searches of
this nature, however, and our own search terms were more expan-
sive than those employed in earlier studies.120 Accordingly, there is
little reason to believe that we missed a significant number of
references to legislative history by members of the Court. Moreover,
we can say with confidence that our data is unlikely to be over-
inclusive in the sense of containing false positives, or opinions that
are marked as containing legislative history usage when in fact they
do not do so. Because all of the opinions that our search flagged as
containing some reference to legislative history were examined at
least twice, it is unlikely that any false positives escaped our
attention.121
Needless to say, not all references to legislative history can be
treated interchangeably for analytical purposes. In particular, there
is an important distinction between the practice of using legislative
history to interpret statutes, on the one hand, and criticism of that
practice, on the other. If our goal is to understand why Justices rely
upon legislative history as a tool of statutory interpretation, it
becomes important to distinguish between, for example, an opinion
by Justice Breyer that relies affirmatively upon legislative history
in order to interpret a statute, and an opinion by Justice Scalia that
mentions legislative history for the purpose of lambasting Justice
Breyer’s willingness to rely upon it. In this vein, Professor Cross has
opined that up to 25% of the Justices’ references to a particular
“interpretive method” may in fact be critical of the method in
question—a conspicuously high estimate that, if accurate, should
give pause to empirical researchers who merely count up references
to a particular approach without also coding their valence.122 At the
same time, however, Cross’s own assessment of legislative history
usage in circuit court opinions suggests that actual judicial criticism
of this particular practice may be very rare.123 
be captured by our search string, it is possible that we undercounted earlier references to
legislative history that may have taken less conventional forms.
120. See supra note 117.
121. See supra note 118 (describing our duplicative approach to coding).
122. CROSS, supra note 65, at 143. Cross does not, however, specify the extent to which the
Justices have been critical of legislative intent as opposed to other interpretive methods. Id.
123. See id. at 184 (discussing the results of a Westlaw search of all circuit court opinions
over a thirty-year period for the term “legislative history,” and indicating that “[o]nly about
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To address this issue, we coded each opinion that contained some
reference to legislative history with an additional variable indicat-
ing whether the opinion explicitly questioned or criticized the use of
legislative history. We further distinguished between opinions that
cited legislative history in a neutral manner, in the sense of not
taking any explicit position on the desirability of the practice, and
those that contained some explicit endorsement or defense of the
practice. To minimize the risk that the coding of this information
was dependent upon subjective evaluations that might vary from
one person to another, we took the following steps. First, we did not
attempt to distinguish between opinions that criticized or praised
legislative history usage in a very obvious way, and those that did
so only in passing. Instead, we adopted a bright-line rule that any
language expressing a view on the usefulness or propriety of
considering legislative history was sufficient to qualify the entire
opinion as either critical or supportive of the practice.124 Second,
each opinion was coded by two law students working separately
from each other, and the results of their work were compared
afterward. Reassuringly, their initial coding decisions were in
1% of the references to ‘legislative history’ … were negative”).
124. By way of example, consider the following excerpt from Justice Harlan’s partial
dissent in Allen v. State Board of Elections:
The majority is left, then, relying on its understanding of the legislative history.
With all deference, I find that the history the Court has garnered undermines
its case, insofar as it is entitled to any weight at all. I refer not only to the
unequivocal statement of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, which the
Court concedes to be diametrically opposed to the construction it adopts. For the
lengthy testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach, upon which the Court seems
to rely, actually provides little more support for its position. Mr. Katzenbach,
unlike his principal assistant, was never directly confronted with the question
raised here, and we are left to guess as to his views. If guesses are to be made,
however, surely it is important to note that though the Attorney General used
many examples to illustrate the operation of § 5, each of them concerned
statutes that had an immediate impact on voter qualifications or which altered
the manner in which the election was conducted. One would imagine that if the
Attorney General believed that § 5 had the remarkable sweep the majority has
now given it, one of his hypotheticals would have betrayed that fact.
393 U.S. 544, 590-91 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations
omitted). It is clear from this excerpt that Justice Harlan referred to legislative history mostly
for the purpose of supporting his analysis on the merits. However, because he prefaced his
analysis by casting doubt on whether the legislative history was “entitled to any weight at
all,” the opinion was coded as critical of legislative history usage rather than neutral. Id. at
590.
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agreement approximately 96% of the time. The few opinions that
generated disagreement among the coders tended to be those that
contained a very minor snippet of language—perhaps just a passing
phrase—that could be interpreted as either criticism or endorse-
ment,125 and the coders generally agreed upon the proper coding of
such opinions following further discussion amongst themselves.
B. Data on Characteristics of the Statutes
Our next step was to compile data on the formal characteristics
of the forty statutes that were interpreted with some degree of
frequency by the Court. We sought in particular to identify statu-
tory characteristics that could plausibly account in an innocent,
legal, and nonideological way for variations in the Court’s use of
legislative history. We identified six characteristics of this type: the
age of the statute, its bulk, its complexity, its novelty, its obscurity,
and the extent to which it had been amended. In devising ways to
measure these characteristics, we were guided by considerations of
objectivity, reliability, ease of implementation, and ease of interpre-
tation.
The age of each statute was ascertained using a combination of
sources. Our first step was to consult a combination of online
sources, including the websites of relevant federal agencies,
Wikipedia, and Westlaw. We then reconciled that information with
the date that each section of the statute first appeared in the
prefatory annotations of the United States Code Annotated or, in
some cases, with the first date as of which a public law mentioned
the popular name of the statute. The oldest statute in our data
proved to be the Bankruptcy Code, which dates back in some form
to 1841.
We defined the bulk of a statute as its length in words.126 The
statutes ranged considerably in length, from under 200 words (in
the case of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) to over 3,500,000 words (in the case of
the Internal Revenue Code). The resulting word counts reflect the
125. For an example of such an opinion and an explanation of how it was ultimately coded,
see note 124 above.
126. We obtained this information by downloading a full-text version of the statute from
Westlaw and subjecting it to Microsoft Word’s word count feature. 
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length of each statute net of all amendments as of 2007. We did not
attempt to capture changes in the net length of statutes that have
occurred between the time they were interpreted by the Court and
2007. Some statutes have changed little in size over time: the
shortest of the statutes for which we collected data—namely, 42
U.S.C. § 1983—has scarcely changed in length since its initial en-
actment in 1871. Others changed significantly, at least in absolute
terms: most notably, the Internal Revenue Code grew from around
420,000 words in length to more than 3,500,000 words over the
study period. In relative terms, however, it is doubtful that much
has changed: the Internal Revenue Code was a heavyweight for the
entire period in question, while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has always been a
flyweight.
There are many reasons to think that the sheer bulk of a statute
will influence the likelihood of legislative history usage. A priori,
however, it is not entirely clear whether one should expect its
overall effect to be positive or negative. On the one hand, shorter
statutes are not necessarily easier to interpret than longer statutes.
They can pose special interpretive challenges of their own that call
for judges to consult legislative history: the text of a short statute
may offer judges very little in the way of guidance and thereby
necessitate resort to external sources of information about the
meaning of the law to fill in what are, quite literally, gaps in the
statutory language. 
On the other hand, longer statutes contain, in a literal sense,
more room for ambiguity and inconsistency. It is simply a fact that
longer statutes contain more language to be interpreted and more
provisions to be reconciled with one another, and it is precisely for
such reasons that judicial resort to legislative history would seem
most appropriate or necessary from a strictly legal perspective. One
might also expect that, ceteris paribus, longer statutes are likely to
cover more substantive ground and to serve a greater number of
policy goals.127 It may be harder for judges to discern a relevant
purpose or principle capable of guiding the interpretation of a
statute when the statute in question contains many provisions that
127. See Randazzo et al., supra note 83, at 1016 (using statute length as a proxy for
“detail,” and finding that more “detailed” statutes curtail the influence of ideology on judicial
decision making by imposing more constraint on judges). 
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embody a multitude of goals and principles. The sheer scope and
ambition of a long statute may thus encourage judges to seek
extrinsic help in the form of legislative history. To the extent that
longer statutes are indeed more likely to serve multiple functions or
advance multiple goals, they should also be more likely to prompt
the use of legislative history as an interpretive aid. Length may also
be a proxy for the extent to which a given area of law is inherently
complicated and requires Congress to devise many moving parts and
address an elaborate administrative overlay—as was indeed the
case with all of the longer statutes in our data, such as the Internal
Revenue Code, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Clean Air
and Water Acts, and ERISA. If statute length does in fact reflect a
complex regulatory environment, that is yet another reason to
expect that it will tend to increase legislative history usage.
It is much easier to ascertain, a priori, what the effect of statutory
complexity should be on the likelihood of legislative history usage:
more complex statutes are by definition more difficult to interpret
and should therefore drive the Justices to consult legislative history
more often. The challenge lies, instead, in defining statutory com-
plexity in such a way that it captures what is of underlying interest
yet can also be measured objectively and reliably.128 Until recently,
it would have been difficult to identify an objective and convenient
way to rate the complexity of large quantities of text. Fortunately,
widely available content-analysis software tools make it possible to
execute a linguistic, fully rule-driven approach to the measurement
of statutory complexity.129 These tools compute the readability of a
given text using objective parsing rules that capture how difficult a
text is to read from a grammatical and linguistic perspective, with
no need for human intervention in the form of subjective coding
decisions. In this vein, we measured the complexity of each statute
128. One approach that some scholars have taken, arguably with some success, is to treat
the length of a statute as a proxy for the level of detail that it contains, and thus to equate
statute length with complexity. See id. at 1009. However, it is possible to imagine a statute
that is very long, but not especially complex. Accordingly, we treat the length and complexity
of a statute as separate concepts to be measured in different ways, notwithstanding the
likelihood that length and complexity are correlated.
129. For an introduction to content-analysis software and a discussion of the promise that
it holds for the study of law and courts, see Michael Evans et al., Recounting the Courts?
Applying Automated Content Analysis To Enhance Empirical Research, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 1007, 1008-10 (2007).
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in our data by computing its Flesch-Kincaid grade level. This score,
a widely used linguistic measure of the readability of a text, is
calculated from two ratios: the ratio of words to sentences, and the
ratio of syllables to words.130 Software for computing such scores is
widely available at no cost for a variety of computing platforms.131
The fact that a statute happens to be novel, from the Court’s
perspective, might also be expected to increase the likelihood of
resort to legislative history. It is reasonable to suspect that the
Justices will feel a greater need to resort to a wider range of
interpretive aids, such as legislative history, when facing a particu-
lar statute for the first time. In such situations, legislative history
may serve in particular as a substitute for prior case law. To the
extent that the Court has interpreted the statute on previous
occasions, those prior interpretations may ease the task of subse-
quent interpretation. Indeed, principles of stare decisis may require
the Court to accept a prior interpretation as controlling, and to treat
certain questions of statutory meaning as resolved, without regard
to what legislative history might say. In the absence of prior
experience with the statute, however, the Justices may feel a
greater need to turn to other sources of information about the
purpose and meaning of the statute. Our measure of statutory
130. See MICHÈLE M. ASPREY, PLAIN LANGUAGE FOR LAWYERS 297-99 (3d ed. 2003); Rudolf
Flesch, A New Readability Yardstick, 32 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 221, 223-26 (1948). We chose
the Flesch-Kincaid grade level over a closely related alternative, the Flesch reading ease
score, for several reasons. First, although both scores are a function of the same two ratios,
the Flesch-Kincaid grade level increases as the difficulty of a text increases, whereas the
Flesch reading ease score decreases. In order for the Flesch reading ease score to constitute
an intuitive measure of complexity, we would have to first invert its scale, which need not be
done with the Flesch-Kincaid grade level score. Second, the scale of the Flesch reading ease
scores is ill-suited to the measurement and comparison of extremely complex statutes. Some
of the statutes in our data are so complex that they received Flesch reading ease scores of 0.
Such statutes are not equally complex; the problem, rather, is that the scale of the Flesch
reading ease scores does not allow for scores below 0. There is no such problem with the upper
bound of the Flesch-Kincaid grade level scores: none of the statutes in our data received the
highest possible score of 100 on that scale. Even the Flesch-Kincaid grade level scores are not
designed, however, to measure extremely high levels of reading difficulty. See infra note 151
and accompanying text.
131. We used a stand-alone, open-source software package called Flesh to compute Flesch
reading ease and reading level scores. Flesh, Sourceforge.net, http://sourceforge.net/projects/
flesh (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). The ability to compute both types of Flesch scores is also
built into the grammar and proofreading tools that are included with current versions of
Microsoft Word.
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novelty was simple: a statute that was enacted within the time
period covered by our data—namely, from 1953 onward—and had
never previously been interpreted by the Court was coded as a novel
one.132
To assess whether a statute was particularly obscure—in the
sense of attracting little attention from judges and litigants—we
collected time-series data on the number of times that the courts of
appeals had cited the popular name of the statute.133 For each
132. Statutes enacted prior to 1953 were coded as lacking novelty because we lacked data
on whether or how often the Court had interpreted such statutes prior to 1953, and we
therefore could not determine which, if any, were truly novel from the Court’s perspective. An
obvious alternative approach to measuring statutory novelty would have been to measure, for
every statute and every case, the exact number of times that the statute had been interpreted
by the Court prior to that case. Although such a measure would be more exact and would also
cover a greater number of statutes, collection of the necessary data would have been
prohibitively difficult. As noted previously, we relied for data collection purposes on Professor
Spaeth’s Supreme Court database, which only dates back to 1953. To correctly identify all
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions prior to that time would have required a
staggering effort. An initial search on Westlaw suggests, for example, that the Internal
Revenue Code had been cited in over 1000 Supreme Court decisions; meanwhile, the Court
has resolved countless habeas corpus questions since the Civil War enactment of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. To collect reliable data on the frequency with which
each of these statutes had been interpreted by the Supreme Court would have required us to
identify and examine every case in which they were cited by the Court. A data collection
project of such magnitude was not within our time and resource constraints.
We did, however, have data on the frequency with which statutes enacted from 1953
onward had been interpreted. Using this subset of our data, we used logit regression to
estimate a statistical model that employed the exact number of times each statute had been
interpreted as a predictor of legislative history usage. See infra note 169. This analysis yielded
no noteworthy results, but this may be attributable to the fact that it made use of less than
one-quarter of our data. See infra note 170.
We note also that the question of when the Court first considered a particular statute may
in some cases be open to debate, as in the case of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the Court decided, in a brief per curiam opinion, to vacate
and remand the case for further fact-finding and did not purport to resolve any questions
surrounding the meaning of Title VII. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). Justice Marshall filed a
concurrence in which he argued, partly on the basis of the legislative history, that the per
curiam opinion left open the possibility of a misreading of the statute on remand. Id. at 544-45
(Marshall, J., concurring). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., handed down two months later, a
unanimous Court did tackle the interpretation of Title VII on the merits and cited legislative
history in doing so. 400 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971). Our coding rules led us to code the earlier
opinions in Phillips, but not the later opinion in Griggs, as involving the interpretation of a
novel statute.
133. After searching for the popular name in Westlaw’s CTA database, we downloaded the
results into the Concordance software package and obtained a frequency count for each time
in a given year that any federal court of appeals issued an opinion referencing the statute’s
popular name (as defined by the United States Code’s popular name table).
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Supreme Court opinion in our data set, we calculated a cumulative
count of how often the statute had been mentioned by popular name
in the courts of appeals from 1953 through the year in which the
Court confronted the statute. As of 2006, this citation count ranged
from a high of 55,687 in the case of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to a low of 4403
in the case of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The purpose
of this exercise was not, of course, to capture every citation to a
given statute by the courts of appeals; rather, it was designed to
show roughly how often an appellate court might dedicate sufficient
attention to a statute to warrant mention of its popular name. 
Finally, to measure how much a given statute had been amended,
we performed an electronic search of the prefatory annotations to
the United States Code Annotated for each section of the statute in
question. These prefatory annotations list, by date, all of the public
laws that have ever amended a given section of a statute.134 We then
calculated a cumulative count of how often any section of a particu-
lar statute had been amended from 1953 through the year in which
the Court interpreted the statute in question. Thus, for example, if
Congress decided in a particular bill to amend ten sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the amendedness count of the
Immigration and Nationality Act increased by ten. By contrast, if
Congress chose to amend only one section, then the amendedness
count increased by only one. In this manner, our measure of
amendedness reflects both the frequency and extent of amendments
made to the statute as a whole, albeit imperfectly.135 An alternative
approach would have been to adjust for the length of the statute, on
the premise that a longer statute is inherently more likely to be the
subject of more frequent and extensive amendment. When we tried
adjusting amendedness in this manner, however, we found that the
resulting variable was not a statistically significant predictor of
134. Using the Concordance software package, we then obtained a frequency count for
every mention of a year in these annotations. The resulting count captured the number of
times that any part of the section at issue was amended. 
135. The number of sections amended does not correspond exactly to the importance or
extent of the changes being made. Congress might, for example, make a minor change to a
single section of a statute that in turn requires purely technical conforming amendments to
every other section of the statute. Conversely, Congress might change a single word in a
single section of a statute—such as by adding the word “gender” to an antidiscrimination
statute—that has an enormous impact on the meaning of the statute as a whole.
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legislative history usage and made no substantive difference to our
results, regardless of whether it was included in addition to or in
lieu of the unadjusted measure.136
C. Data on Ideological Factors
Finally, we collected information on the ideological leanings of the
Justices themselves, the ideological direction of the Court’s deci-
sions, and the ideological character of the Congresses that enacted
each of the statutes in our data. For our measure of the ideology of
the Justices, we employed the scores devised by Professors Martin
and Quinn,137 which have become increasingly popular in the
empirical literature on the Supreme Court.138 Unlike crude proxies
for ideology, such as the party of the appointing President, the
Martin-Quinn scores are computed from the actual voting records
of the Justices and provide a quantitative measure of the ideological
preferences of the Justices relative to one another.139 At the same
time, unlike other sophisticated proxy measures such as the Segal-
Cover scores and common space scores,140 they have the added
136. We adjusted amendedness for statute length by dividing the amendedness measure
by the length of the statute. We tried doing so, moreover, with both the regular and natural
log versions of both our amendedness and statute length measures.
137. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 138-45
(2002).
138. See Fischman & Law, supra note 96, at 205-06. In lieu of the Martin-Quinn scores, we
considered using the “judicial common space scores” devised by Professors Epstein, Martin,
Segal, and Westerland, which are designed to assess the ideology of lower court judges,
Supreme Court Justices, members of Congress, and Presidents on the same scale in a manner
that permits direct comparisons. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (describing the judicial common space scores); Lee Epstein, The
Judicial Common Space, http://epstein.law. northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2010) (follow “click here for the data” hyperlink) (offering the scores for download).
From a methodological standpoint, for purposes of testing our hypothesis that the ideology
of the enacting Congress and interpreting Justice interact, see supra Part III.E.3, it would
have been preferable to use the judicial common space scores because they are designed to
locate Justices and members of Congress on the same scale. We could not use them, however,
because they are currently available only as far back as 1937. See Epstein, supra.
139. The Martin-Quinn scores, which are calculated using Bayesian simulation techniques,
range from the -6.656 score computed for Justice Douglas at the “far left,” to the 3.884 score
computed for Justice Thomas at the “far right” of the spectrum. See Martin & Quinn, supra
note 137, at 145.
140. See Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan
1696 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1653
advantage of capturing changes in the ideological preferences of
the Justices over time.141 A recent head-to-head comparison has
demonstrated that the Martin-Quinn scores, and other approaches
of the same ilk, substantially outperform other popular measures of
ideology at explaining judicial voting behavior.142 For each opinion
in the data, we used the Martin-Quinn score of the authoring
Justice as of the year that the case was decided.143
To evaluate whether the ideological direction of the Court’s
decision might influence the propensity of the Justices to cite legis-
lative history in their opinions, we imported information from the
Spaeth database on the ideological direction—liberal or conserva-
tive—of the Court’s outcome in each of the cases in our data.144
Finally, we wished to test the additional hypothesis that the
ideological direction of the Court’s decision might affect liberal and
conservative Justices differently. For example, one could imagine
that liberal Justices might be more likely to cite legislative history
when the Court arrives at a conservative outcome. The weight of
legislative history may be necessary to motivate a liberal Justice to
reach a conservative outcome when writing for the majority, or
perhaps liberal Justices may feel the need to reach for legislative
history to bolster a dissenting opinion. Alternatively, one could
argue that liberal Justices might be more likely to cite legislative
Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 627-31 (2001) (devising the common space scores);
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989) (articulating the basis of what are now known as
the “Segal-Cover” scores).
141. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When,
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1503-04 (2007); Martin & Quinn, supra note
137, at 145.
142. See Fischman & Law, supra note 96, at 209 (finding that ideology measures calculated
on an individual basis from each judge’s actual voting history, and therefore of the same
variety as the Martin-Quinn scores, are a much better predictor of judicial voting on the
federal courts of appeals than either common space scores or party of appointing President);
id. at 205-09 (finding that the Martin-Quinn scores performed much better at explaining the
voting behavior of the Justices in five different areas of law than either party of appointing
President or the Segal-Cover scores).
143. A very small number of opinions were jointly authored by more than one Justice. See,
e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 44 (1959) (Frankfurter & 
Harlan, JJ., concurring). In such cases, we averaged the Martin-Quinn scores of the authoring
Justices.
144. The manner in which the Spaeth database codes this particular variable has been the
subject of some criticism. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 821-22.
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history in cases that reach liberal outcomes on the ground that the
use of legislative history is inherently well suited to reaching liberal
outcomes. To detect evidence of such factors at work, we calculated
an interaction term by multiplying the Martin-Quinn score of the
authoring Justice by the ideological direction of the decision. 
For our measure of the ideology of the Congress that enacted each
statute in our data, we relied upon the DW-NOMINATE scores of
congressional ideology devised by Professors Poole and Rosenthal,
which are based on statistical analysis of congressional roll call
voting and widely used in the political science literature.145 Our
reason for measuring congressional ideology was to test the
ideological alignment hypothesis, or the theory that a Justice will be
more inclined to look to the legislative history of a statute if he or
she is sympathetic to the aims of the legislators who enacted it.146 To
test for this kind of interaction between the ideology of the enacting
Congress and that of the interpreting Justice, we calculated an
interaction term. To do so, we first averaged the DW-NOMINATE
scores of the median members of the House and Senate in order to
arrive at an ideology score for the enacting Congress. We then
multiplied that score by the opinion author’s Martin-Quinn score.
The resulting number can be interpreted in substantive terms as a
measure of the ideological proximity between the enacting Congress
and the interpreting Justice: the higher the number, the closer the
proximity.147
For a number of reasons, some of which are technical in nature,
our measure of ideological proximity was bound to be somewhat
145. See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Data Download Front Page, http://www.voteview.
com/dwnl.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). To be specific, we used the dimension-one DW-
NOMINATE scores because the dimension of ideological disagreement captured by the
dimension-two scores has been largely defunct since Reconstruction. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL,
supra, at 40-51 (concluding that “a one-dimensional model typically provides a good fit to the
data, with a second dimension being needed in periods when race issues are distinct from
economic ones”).
146. See supra Part III.E.3 (setting forth the ideological alignment hypothesis).
147. The scale employed by both the DW-NOMINATE scores and the Martin-Quinn scores
assigns negative numbers to liberals and positive numbers to conservatives. Thus, if both the
enacting Congress and interpreting Justice are liberal, the number one obtains by multiplying
their scores is positive. However, if one is liberal whereas the other is conservative, then the
number one obtains by multiplying the scores is negative. 
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inexact.148 Accurate measurement of the ideology of the relevant
Congress, in particular, is frustrated by the fact that, in many cases,
the Justices are asked to interpret a statutory amendment in
addition to, or in lieu of, the originally enacted statute, and the
amending Congress is of a different ideological tenor and intent
than the enacting Congress. In such cases, there is no clear and
objective way to choose between the ideology of the enacting and
amending Congress, or to weight and combine the two scores. In
light of our time and resource constraints, and in order to avoid
becoming enmeshed in a substantial number of highly subjective
determinations about whether or to what extent the Court was
interpreting an amendment in lieu of, or in addition to, the origi-
nally enacted statute, we opted to rely exclusively upon the ideology
of the Congress that originally enacted the statute. Ultimately,
however, although we were forced to make difficult methodological
choices that could not be ideal in all respects, these choices were
vindicated by the results of our analysis.149
V. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
A. Characteristics of the Statutes
In order to study the impact of various statutory characteristics
such as complexity and age on legislative history usage, it was of
course necessary for us first to measure each of those characteris-
tics. In the course of measuring characteristics such as statutory
complexity and amendedness, however, we generated a number of
facts about a wide variety of federal statutes that even those with
148. It is worth noting in particular the DW-NOMINATE and Martin-Quinn scores are not
designed to locate Justices and members of the same Congress on the same scale and thus are
not directly comparable: for example, a Martin-Quinn score of 0 may imply a different
ideological position on a different policy dimension than a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.
Accordingly, the interaction term that we calculated is, in a number of ways, not a precise
measure of the ideological proximity or similarity between enacting Congress and interpreting
Justice. However, other measures of ideology that might have been preferable did not extend
back sufficiently far in time to cover the enactment of all the statutes in our data set. See
supra note 138.
149. See infra Part VI.B.2 (describing our finding that our measure of ideological proximity
between the enacting Congress and interpreting Justice is a statistically significant predictor
of legislative history usage).
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no interest at all in the topic of legislative history may find intrigu-
ing.
Ours may be the first ever study of the linguistic complexity of a
broad range of federal statutes. The Immigration and Nationality
Act and the federal habeas corpus statute150 are, linguistically
speaking, the least complex of the forty frequently interpreted
statutes that we analyzed. With Flesch-Kincaid grade levels of 9.50
and 9.70 respectively, both statutes are supposedly within the
reading comprehension skills of a tenth grader. For purposes of
comparison, the Constitution receives a score of 12.35 and is thus
appropriate reading for a college freshman. At the opposite extreme,
the Robinson-Patman Act earns the dubious honor of being the most
complex statute that we analyzed, with a Flesch-Kincaid grade level
of 43.11. To put that figure in perspective, the typical judge or
attorney, after graduating from university and law school, has only
nineteen years of formal schooling and would therefore need to
attend school for over twenty-four more years—the equivalent of
eight S.J.D. degrees, plus an LL.M.—before attaining the reading
proficiency level that the Robinson-Patman Act supposedly de-
mands. 
The conclusion to be drawn is not, of course, that judges and
lawyers must have eight S.J.D. degrees in order to understand the
Robinson-Patman Act, or, for that matter, that tenth graders are
capable of navigating federal habeas law. Rather, measures of
reading difficulty, such as the Flesch-Kincaid grade levels have
their limitations as actual measures of the readability of legal texts,
particularly at extreme levels of linguistic complexity that they were
not intended to capture.151 Our hypothesis is, instead, that some
statutes are truly more complex than others from a linguistic
perspective, and that such complexity is likely to create difficulties
for a would-be interpreter. The fact that the Flesch-Kincaid scores
degenerate at extreme levels should not obscure the fact that some
statutes are more difficult to read than others, and it should not be
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2006).
151. The formula underlying the Flesch-Kincaid scores, in particular, was not designed to
provide measurements beyond a seventeenth-grade reading level. See ASPREY, supra note 130,
at 297 n.19; see also id. at 297-99 (discussing and demonstrating the limitations of the Flesch-
Kincaid scores and their ilk in the context of an Australian tax statute). 
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surprising if such statutes drive judges to seek interpretive help
wherever they can find it, including in the legislative history. 
Table 1: Complexity of Each Statute as of 2006, 
Measured by Its Flesch-Kincaid Grade Reading Level
Statute Flesch-Kincaid score
Immigration and Nationality Act 9.5
Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.) 9.7
National Firearms Act 13.26
Social Security Act 13.30
Selective Service Act 13.93
Administrative Procedure Act 14.49
Food and Drug Act 14.83
Bankruptcy Code 15.66
Natural Gas Policy Act 17.01
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 17.03
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act 17.19
Title VII 17.43
Clean Water Act 17.81
AFDC 18.22
ERISA 18.29
Jones Act (maritime law; seamen’s rights) 18.38
Sherman Act (antitrust) 18.82
Freedom of Information Act 19.41
Securities Act; Securities and Exchange Act 19.52
Labor-Management Relations Act 19.75
National Labor Relations Act 19.79
Clean Air Act 20.46
RICO 20.47
Federal Power Act 20.69
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 20.75
42 U.S.C. § 1983 20.92
Americans with Disabilities Act 20.96
Clayton Act (antitrust) 22.33
Interstate Commerce Act 22.53
Internal Revenue Code 22.53
Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation 22.72
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152. The Internal Revenue Code occupies an entire volume of the United States Code and
is frequently amended both for technical reasons and for the purpose of reauthorizing
provisions that would otherwise expire. See Posting of David Zaring to The Conglomerate,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/07/the-most-amende-html (July 8, 2008). 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act 22.93
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 23.02
False Claims Act 25.26
Fair Labor Standards Act 25.60
Federal Tort Claims Act 27.45
Railway Labor Act 27.48
Voting Rights Act 29.32
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (civil rights attorneys’ fees) 39.85
Robinson-Patman Act (antitrust) 43.11
Another characteristic that varied considerably by statute was
that of amendedness. On the whole, amendments are a common
occurrence: we found 16,413 instances in which a section of a
relevant statute was amended during the period under examination.
This overall figure is, however, somewhat deceiving. The majority
of these amendments—10,301 of them, to be precise—were made to
a single massive and atypical statute, the Internal Revenue Code.152
Most statutes were amended much less frequently. Table 2 lists the
cumulative number of times that any section of each statute had
been amended as of 2006, the most recent year for which we
collected data. The range is considerable. At the high end, the
Internal Revenue Code underwent nearly ten times as many
amendments as its nearest competitor, the Immigration and
Nationality Act. At the opposite extreme, the Jones Act was never
amended, whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Robinson-Patman Act
were each the subject of just two amendments. 
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Table 2: Amendedness of Each Statute,
 Measured by the Total Number of Amendments to All 
Sections as of 2006
Statute Amendments
Internal Revenue Code 10,301
Immigration and Nationality Act 1109
Food and Drug Act 714
Clean Air Act 531
ERISA 481
Clean Water Act 379
Bankruptcy Code 315
AFDC 232
Federal Power Act 223
Interstate Commerce Act 214
Securities Act; Securities and Exchange Act 174
Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation 165
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 130
Social Security Act 127
Fair Labor Standards Act 120
Labor-Management Relations Act 113
Clayton Act (antitrust) 110
Selective Service Act 107
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (civil rights attorneys’ fees) 101
Title VII 87
Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq.) 70
National Labor Relations Act 61
Railway Labor Act 59
Voting Rights Act 58
Americans with Disabilities Act 57
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act 53
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 50
National Firearms Act 44
RICO 43
Federal Tort Claims Act 35
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 30
Administrative Procedure Act 27
Sherman Act (antitrust) 25
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153. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2006) (formerly known as the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Statute).
155. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397jj (2006).
157. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
Natural Gas Policy Act 23
Federal Employers’ Liability Act 20
False Claims Act 12
Freedom of Information Act 9
42 U.S.C. § 1983 2
Robinson-Patman Act (antitrust) 2
Jones Act (maritime law; seamen’s rights) 0
B. Which Statutes Generate the Most Legislative History Usage?
In the aggregate, the raw data reveals several unsurprising facts.
First, some statutes were significantly more likely than others to
elicit citations to legislative history. Second, the Justices varied
widely in the frequency with which they made use of legislative
history. Third, their overall legislative history usage has declined in
recent years. Closer examination of the data, however, reveals a
considerable amount of interesting variation and unexpected
behavior at the individual level.
An initial glance at Table 3 suggests that the statutes that pro-
voked the most frequent resort to legislative history were a motley
group about which it is difficult to generalize. Tied at the top of the
list were the Food and Drug Act and the Freedom of Information
Act.153 Although neither is especially lengthy or the object of
especially frequent amendment, both sent the Justices scurrying to
the legislative history nearly three-quarters of the time. Other
statutes that generated high citation rates to legislative history
included the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families statute;154 the
Administrative Procedure Act;155 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which governs
attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights suits; the
Bankruptcy Code; the Social Security Act;156 the Federal Tort
Claims Act; the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act;157
1704 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1653
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act;158 the
National Firearms Act;159 and the Federal Power Act.160 At the other
extreme, the statute that generated the lowest citation rate to
legislative history was the Jones Act, which prompted the Justices
to invoke legislative history less than 14% of the time, followed by
the federal habeas corpus provisions at under 17%.
Among the most complex of the statutes in our data, the Bank-
ruptcy Code was particularly likely to result in a citation to
legislative history when interpreted—more so than other mammoth
and byzantine statutes like the Internal Revenue Code and the
Immigration and Nationality Act, both of which have their own
titles of the United States Code, yet neither of which proved more
likely than not to trigger a reference to legislative history. 










Food and Drug Act 73.7% 14/19
Freedom of Information Act 73.7% 42/57
Clean Air Act 71.4% 15/21
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (civil rights
attorneys’ fees) 70.7% 29/41
Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act 69.0% 20/29
National Firearms Act 68.5% 37/54
Social Security Act 68.2% 15/22
Bankruptcy Code 61.9% 78/126
158. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006).
159. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (2006).
160. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2006).
161. Overall, the differences in frequency of legislative history usage among the statutes
were statistically significant at the p < .001 level, per a Pearson chi-square test.
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Longshore & Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act 60.0% 36/60
AFDC 58.1% 18/31
Federal Tort Claims Act 57.6% 34/59
Administrative Procedure Act 57.5% 23/40
Securities Act; Securities &
Exchange Act 57.4% 58/101
ERISA 57.1% 44/77
Federal Power Act 57.1% 12/21
RICO 56.3% 18/32
Age Discrimination in 
Employment 55.3% 21/38
Railway Labor Act 55.1% 27/49
Fair Labor Standards Act 54.3% 25/46
Robinson-Patman Act (anti-
trust) 53.8% 21/39
Natural Gas Policy Act 53.3% 16/30
Voting Rights Act 51.4% 57/111
Title VII 50.0% 98/196
Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act 50.0% 11/22
Interstate Commerce Act 49.1% 27/55
Clean Water Act 48.9% 23/47
National Labor Relations Act 48.8% 122/250
Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act 48.5% 16/33
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Selective Service Act 45.0% 18/40
Clayton Act (antitrust) 41.7% 48/115
False Claims Act 41.4% 12/29
42 U.S.C. § 1983 40.4% 57/141
Americans with Disabilities Act 32.6% 14/43
Sherman Act (antitrust) 30.6% 45/147
Federal Employers’ Liability 26.5% 18/68
Habeas Corpus (28 USC
§§ 2241 et seq.) 16.8% 28/167
Jones Act (maritime law;   
seamen’s rights) 13.9% 5/36
TOTAL 47.9% 1482/3095
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Figure 1: Number of Opinions Citing Legislative History, by 
Statute
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Figure 2: Percentage of Opinions Citing Legislative History, by
Statute
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C. Which Justices Use Legislative History the Most?
It is much easier to discern a pattern among the Justices in terms
of their propensity to cite legislative history. Overall, the Justices
cited legislative history in just under half, or 47.9%, of their
statutory interpretation opinions. As expected, more liberal Justices
were, on the whole, more frequent users of legislative history than
conservative ones, although the data contained a few mild surprises.
Table 4 sets forth the raw data on legislative history usage by each
of the Justices included in our study. The third column lists the
number and percentage of statutory interpretation opinions in
which each Justice referred to legislative history. The fourth column
offers some indication of the extent to which each Justice was
explicitly critical of legislative history usage: it reports the number
and percentage of each Justice’s opinions that contained at least
some criticism of the practice.162 Such criticism turns out, on the
whole, to be very rare. Only 1.1% of all the opinions in our data
contained any language that could be deemed critical of legislative
history usage, either in general or in the context of a specific case.
It thus appears that such criticism is no more common on the
Supreme Court than on the federal courts of appeals.163 The
majority of the Justices in our data—eighteen out of thirty-one, to
be precise—never voiced any such criticism, and of the remaining
thirteen Justices, eight did so on just one occasion.
162. Use of legislative history and criticism of legislative history usage were not mutually
exclusive. See, e.g., supra note 124 (discussing Justice Harlan’s opinion in Allen v. State Board
of Elections, which was coded as both citing legislative history and criticizing legislative
history usage).
163. See supra note 123 (describing Professor Cross’s finding that only “about 1%” of circuit
court statutory interpretation decisions contain negative references to the practice of citing
legislative history). 
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Alito 6 2 (33.3%) 0
Black 100 28 (28.0%) 0
Blackmun 202 110 (55.9%) 1 (0.5%)
Brennan 238 166 (69.7%) 1 (0.4%)
Breyer 69 27 (39.1%) 0
Burger 75 45 (60.0%) 0
Burton 30 13 (43.3%) 0
Clark 72 39 (54.2%) 1 (1.4%)
Douglas 204 83 (40.7%) 0
Fortas 23 6 (26.1%) 0
Frankfurter 67 28 (41.8%) 0
Ginsburg 53 26 (49.1%) 1 (1.9%)
Goldberg 32 14 (43.8%) 0
Harlan 168 58 (34.5%) 1 (0.6%)
Jackson 4 1 (25.0%) 0
Kennedy 87 29 (33.3%) 5 (5.7%)
Marshall 159 114 (71.7%) 1 (0.6%)
Minton 13 5 (38.5%) 0
O’Connor 133 66 (47.4%) 2 (1.5%)
Powell 125 66 (52.8%) 1 (0.8%)
Reed 12 5 (41.7%) 0
Rehnquist 136 72 (52.9%) 4 (2.9%)
Roberts 9 1 (11.1%) 0
Scalia 151 28 (18.5%)   13 (8.6%)
Souter 77 37 (48.1%) 0
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Stevens 296 148 (50.0%) 1 (0.3%)
Stewart 143 75 (52.4%) 0
Thomas 80 15 (18.8%) 3 (3.8%)
Warren 64 40 (62.5%) 0
White 227 125 (55.1%) 0
Whittaker 33 8 (24.2%) 0




3095 1482 (47.9%) 36 (1.1%)
164
164. The overall differences in frequency of legislative history usage among the Justices
were statistically significant at the p < .001 level, once again per a Pearson chi-square test.
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Figure 3: The Frequency with Which Each Justice Cited 
Legislative History, by Number of Opinions
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Figure 4: The Frequency with Which Each Justice Cited 
Legislative History, by Percentage
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Two of the Court’s most liberal Justices—namely, Justices
Brennan and Marshall—also led the Court in the use of legislative
history; Justice Marshall, in particular, topped the charts with a
legislative history usage rate of over 70%. Chief Justice Warren,
another renowned liberal, cited legislative history in over 60% of his
statutory interpretation opinions. The most liberal Justice in our
data set as measured by the Martin-Quinn scores, Justice Douglas,
referred to legislative history a relatively paltry 34.8% of the time,
but this may be attributable more to the brevity of his opinions165
and the speed with which he produced them166 than to any aversion
to legislative history per se. Justice O’Connor lived up to her
reputation as a middle-of-the-road Justice, with a legislative history
usage rate (47.4%) that almost exactly equaled the overall average.
Likewise, Justice Souter’s propensity to use legislative history
(48.1%) was decidedly average. 
Among those with a reputation for conservatism, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was perhaps surprisingly prone to using legislative
history: he did so in his statutory interpretation opinions more often
than not (52.9%), a rate that exceeded the overall average and made
him a more frequent user of legislative history than moderate
Justices such as O’Connor, Powell (52.8%), and Stewart (52.4%) and,
indeed, decidedly liberal ones such as Douglas and Goldberg
(43.8%). However, the Court’s most vocal critic of legislative history,
Justice Scalia, behaved true to his word, for the most part. Only
18.5% of his statutory interpretation opinions made any reference
to legislative history. For all practical intents and purposes, he and
Justice Thomas, who referred to legislative history only 18.8% of the
time, have been the least likely to cite legislative history. Although
Chief Justice Roberts’s raw rate of 11.1% is lower, the very limited
number of statutory interpretation opinions that he has authored
makes it impossible to draw conclusions about his behavior with
confidence. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s behavior did not vary sig-
nificantly as between his majority opinions, concurrences, and
165. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Dissent on Douglas, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 19, 1981, at 2
(characterizing Justice Douglas’s opinions as short and often “sloppy”).
166. See ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 42 (2006) (quoting Justice Douglas on his
tendency to write opinions more quickly than other members of the Court, and to receive more
writing assignments as a result).
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dissents. At the same time, Justice Scalia was somewhat sparing in
overt criticism of the practice: only 8.6% of his statutory interpreta-
tion opinions contained such criticism. In a sense, one might say
that he preferred to lead by example rather than by criticism.
Whether he actually succeeded in influencing other members of the
Court, however, is an important question that we address below, on
the basis of a regression analysis that controls for other variables.167 
D. Is Legislative History Usage on the Decline?
Figure 5 depicts the percentage of statutory interpretation
opinions that cited legislative history in each of the years covered by
our data. The result is a much needed update to the existing
literature on trends in the Court’s usage of legislative history, much
of which reports now-outdated conclusions based on data from the
mid-1990s or earlier.168 Figure 5 shows, consistent with the existing
literature, that from the 1950s through the early 1970s, the Court
became increasingly enamored of legislative history. Its use then
reached a plateau of sorts for approximately a decade: legislative
history usage hit its overall peak of nearly 70% twice—once in 1973
and again in 1984. By the mid-1990s, however, it had dropped
sharply. Although the overall level of legislative history usage
experienced a rebound in the late 1990s, it never recaptured the
lofty heights of the 1970s and early 1980s, and the rebound proved
short-lived. By the 2004 term, legislative history usage had reached
its nadir, with only 11.1% of the Justices’ statutory interpretation
opinions making reference to legislative history. 
167. See infra Part VI.B.3.
168. See supra Part II.A.
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Figure 5: Proportion of Supreme Court Opinions Citing 
Legislative History, 1953-2006 
VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. Description of the Regression Model
Without further analysis, it is impossible to say why some stat-
utes, and some Justices, were associated with more frequent use of
legislative history than others. In order to test various explanations
for these differences, and to identify more generally the determi-
nants of legislative history usage, we employed logit regression
with robust standard errors to estimate a model of legislative
history usage.169 Our model used a variety of variables to predict the
presence or absence of legislative history in a given opinion. The
model took the following form:
169. The model was estimated in Stata 11.0 using the “logit, robust” command.
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Pr(opinion cites legislative history) = B0 + B1 (bulk) + B2(complexity)
+ B3 (obscurity) + B4(amendedness) + B5 (first-time interpretation)
+ B6 (age) + B7 (age2) + B8 (year) + B9 ( year2) + B10 (age * year) +
B11(age * year)2 + B12(dissent) + B13(concur) + B14 (special concur-
rence) + B15 (unanimous) + B16 (author ideology) + B17 (outcome
ideology) + B18 (author ideology * outcome ideology) + B19 (author
ideology * legislative ideology) + B20(Scalia authorship) + B21(Scalia
on Court) + B22 (post-Chevron) + e
The dependent variable in our model, “opinion cites legislative
history,” was coded as a 1 if the opinion contained any reference to
the legislative history of the statute at issue, and 0 otherwise. The
model contained a total of twenty-two independent variables, some
of which were interactions or transformations of other variables.170
Preliminary goodness-of-fit analyses suggested that some vari-
ables—for example, frequency of amendment and time-related vari-
ables such as statutory age and year of decision—might be related
in nonlinear fashion to legislative history usage. Accordingly, we
used the natural log, or the square of certain variables in addition
to, or in lieu of, the raw versions of those variables, as guided by the
results of those preliminary analyses. 
170. We also estimated an expanded model on a subset of our data for the purpose of
testing the hypothesis that a statute that has rarely or never been the subject of prior
interpretation by the Court is more likely to elicit legislative history usage. The expanded
model was identical to the main model, save for the addition of a variable reflecting the exact
number of times that the statute in question had previously been interpreted by the Court.
We further estimated an alternative version of the expanded model using a simple dummy
variable that was coded 0 if the statute had never been interpreted by the Court, and 1 if it
had ever been the subject of interpretation by the Court. We lacked reliable data, however,
on the frequency with which the Court interpreted statutes enacted prior to 1953.
Accordingly, methodological considerations compelled us to estimate both versions of the
expanded model using only the data we had collected for statutes enacted in 1953 or later.
This move greatly reduced the amount of data available for analysis, from 3095 opinions to
a mere 696. 
In light of these severe data limitations, it is not surprising that we found no statistically
significant evidence of a relationship between the number of times that the Court had
previously interpreted a statute and the likelihood of legislative history usage. It would be
premature, however, to reject the hypothesis that such a relationship does exist. Many of the
variables that proved to be significant predictors of legislative history usage when we
estimated the main model using the full data set, such as the length of the statute and the
ideology of the authoring Justice, failed to reach statistical significance in the context of the
expanded model—a fact that is most likely explained by the loss of over three-quarters of the
data.
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The components of the independent variables were defined as
follows:
(1) bulk = the natural log of the statute's length in words as of
2007;
(2) complexity = the natural log of the Flesch-Kincaid reading
grade level of the statute;
(3) obscurity = the frequency with which the statute in question
had been cited by the federal courts of appeals, measured as of
the year in which the opinion was authored;
(4) amendedness = the natural log of the number of times that
any section of the statute in question was amended, from 1953
through the year in which the opinion was authored;
(5) first-time interpretation = a dummy variable coded 1 if the
statute in question was enacted within the time period covered
by our data and had not previously been interpreted by the
Court, 0 otherwise;
(6) age = the age of the statute in years, measured as of the
year in which the opinion was authored;
(7) year = the term in which the Supreme Court decided the
case, as indicated in the Spaeth database;
(8) dissent = a dummy variable coded 1 if the opinion in
question was a dissent, 0 otherwise, as indicated in the Spaeth
database;
(9) concur = a dummy variable coded 1 if the opinion in
question was a concurrence that agreed with both the disposi-
tion and the opinion of the Court, 0 otherwise, as indicated in
the Spaeth database;
(10) special concurrence = a dummy variable coded 1 if the
opinion in question was a concurrence that agreed with the
disposition but not necessarily the opinion of the Court, as
indicated in the Spaeth database;171
171. Per Professor Spaeth’s explanation in the documentation that accompanies the
database, this category includes any opinion that both concurs in part and dissents in part,
if the Justice “votes to dispose of the case in a manner more closely approximating that of the
majority than that of the dissenter(s).” Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme
Court Judicial Database, 1953-2007 Terms: Documentation 66 (2008), available at
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/allcourt_codebook.pdf (last updated Sept. 9, 2008).
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(11) unanimous = a dummy variable coded 1 if the opinion in
question was the opinion of a fully unanimous Court and there
were no other opinions in the case, 0 otherwise; 
(12) author ideology = the Martin-Quinn score of the authoring
Justice;
(13) outcome ideology = the ideological direction of the result
reached by the authoring Justice, as coded from information in
the Spaeth database;
(14) legislative ideology = the average of the DW-NOMINATE
scores of the median members of the House and Senate that
enacted the statute;
(15) Scalia authorship = a dummy variable coded 1 if the
opinion was authored by Justice Scalia, 0 otherwise; 
(16) Scalia on Court = a dummy variable coded 1 if Justice
Scalia was on the Court at the time the case was decided, 0
otherwise; and
(17) Post-Chevron = a dummy variable coded 1 if the opinion in
question was authored after the Court decided Chevron U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council,172 0 otherwise.
B. The Results of the Regression 
The results of the regression are described below in Table 5 and
Table 6. For those with an appetite for technical detail, the raw
coefficients and standard errors are reported in Appendix I. Overall,
the model proved relatively effective at predicting the use of
legislative history. Simply by always choosing the most common
outcome—namely, that legislative history is not used—we would
correctly predict 52.1% of the time whether an opinion will in fact
use legislative history. A worthwhile model should offer more
predictive power than guesswork of this type. Our model does so: it
correctly predicts the use of legislative history 69.5% of the time and
achieves a healthy 36.5% proportional reduction in error.173 That is
to say, we are more than one-third more likely to predict legislative
172. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. Those cases in which legislative history was actually used were correctly predicted by
the model 70% of the time, whereas those cases in which legislative history was not used were
correctly predicted by the model 69% of the time.
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history usage correctly by relying on our model than by simply
guessing the modal outcome. Many, but not all, of the individual
variables in our model proved to be significant predictors of
legislative history usage at the p # .05 level. 




























Scalia authorship - <0.001
Time trends: year of decision + <0.001
(year of decision)2 - <0.001
174. Because the coefficients from a logit regression, unlike those from a regular linear
regression, lack any straightforward substantive interpretation, we do not report them here.
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 Table 6: Variables That Were Not Statistically Significant   






Ideological and personal factors: outcome ideology
author ideology * outcome ideology
Scalia on Court
Time trends: age of statute * year of decision
(age of statute * year of decision)2
1. Formal and Legal Variables
On the whole, the results offer a measure of vindication both for
those who emphasize the importance of formal and legal factors, and
for those who insist that ideology matters. It is clear that the formal
and legal characteristics of a statute do influence the likelihood that
Justices will resort to legislative history. Four of the six statutory
characteristics that we included in our model—namely the bulk,
complexity, age, and amendedness of the statute—were statistically
significant predictors of legislative history usage. These findings
offer strong support for what we have termed the guidance-seeking
hypothesis: they suggest that the Justices turn to legislative history
as a source of guidance when faced with statutes that are, in some
objective sense, difficult to interpret.175 Indeed, it is difficult to
identify any other motivation on the part of the Justices that might
explain these findings.
The fact that the relationship between amendedness and
legislative history usage was negative instead of positive ran
contrary to our initial expectations but can easily be explained. It
was our hypothesis that the Justices would use legislative history
175. Supra Part III.A.
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more often in order to make sense of a frequently changing statute.
Our results indicate, instead, that more frequent amendment leads
to less legislative history usage. Insofar as amendments are enacted
to clarify and fill gaps in previously ambiguous or incomplete
statutory language, however, it is not difficult to see how more
amendments might obviate rather than necessitate resort to
legislative history.
Particularly noteworthy is the nature of the relationship between
legislative history usage and statute age. The fact that the coeffi-
cients on both the regular and squared versions of the age variable
are statistically significant means in practical terms that the
relationship between statute age and legislative history usage is
nonlinear. Moreover, the fact that the coefficients point in opposite
directions indicates that the nature of the relationship switches over
time: Initially, the probability of legislative history usage decreases
with age and bottoms out when a statute is approximately ninety
years old. Beyond that age, however, the likelihood of legislative
history usage begins to increase as the statute gets older.176 Figure
6 illustrates this pattern. The solid line depicts how the predicted
probability that an opinion will cite legislative history varies with
the age of the statute, when all other variables (such as
amendedness, length, and the author’s ideology) are held constant
at their median values. The dotted lines represent the upper and
lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval, which is to say that it is
95% likely that the true impact of statute age on the probability of
legislative history usage lies within these bounds. 
176. We further note that the squared version of the interaction term between statutory
age and year of decision approached statistical significance (p = 0.133). In practical terms, this
suggests the possibility that statutes of different vintages may exhibit distinct legislative
history usage trends over time: there is at least some reason to suspect that the relationship
between statutory age and legislative history usage may be different for newer statutes than
for older statutes. By conventional social science standards, however, the evidence is not
strong enough to be considered statistically significant.
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  Figure 6: Impact of Statute Age on Predicted Probability of  
Legislative History Usage, 
Holding All Other Variables at Their Median Values
 Why might the probability of legislative history usage exhibit a
waning then waxing trend over the life of a statute?177 This pattern
177. It might also be asked whether the pattern seen in Figure 6 is real and does not
merely reflect the limitations of our data or methodology. One possibility, in particular, is that
the pattern might be the illusory byproduct of a skew in the distribution of the underlying
data. The fact that the confidence interval becomes wider for the oldest statutes, denoting
greater uncertainty as to the true probability of legislative history usage, might give cause for
suspicion that the upward trend for statutes older than 90 might be the result of a few
extreme observations at the high end of the statute age range, combined with an overall lack
of data on the interpretation of older statutes. 
When we examine the distribution of our data, however, the results assuage these concerns.
Appendix II graphs the number of opinions in our data against the age of the statute at issue
and reveals that our data contains a considerable number of opinions involving the
interpretation of older statutes. The graph reveals a roughly bimodal distribution: there is a
mass of data centered on a statute age of approximately 30, and a smaller but still
considerable mass of data centered on a statute age of approximately 120. Thus, although we
have more data on the interpretation of statutes that are less than 90 years old, our analysis
nevertheless included a meaningful amount of data on the interpretation of statutes ranging
in age from 90 up to nearly 145.
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may reflect how challenges in the interpretation of a statute unfold,
and are eventually solved by the Court, over time. It is not surpris-
ing that, as they become older, statutes might attract decreasing use
of legislative history. When a statute is first enacted, the Court has
little experience with it yet faces the widest range of unanswered
questions about its meaning. Its inexperience with the statute and
the novelty of the questions posed may combine to encourage resort
to legislative history. The older the statute becomes, however, the
more substantial the body of precedent the Court develops, thus
reducing the need for resort to legislative history.178 The fact that
legislative history usage is high for new statutes but declines with
age is consistent with the possibility that questions of statutory
meaning are increasingly solved by resort to accumulated precedent
in lieu of legislative history. 
There is also, however, a countervailing trend that might cause
statutes beyond a certain age to attract more, not less, legislative
history usage. As time passes, a statute is increasingly applied to
circumstances that are increasingly alien from those prevailing at
the time of its enactment, while many of the precedents that
previously offered guidance to the Court may themselves become
obsolete. The result is increased uncertainty about the proper
application of the statute that may compel the Justices to cast about
for interpretive aids such as legislative history. It may be that,
beyond a certain age, the guidance of precedent and the benefit of
experience can no longer compensate for the interpretive uncer-
tainty that surrounds an increasingly antiquated statute.
Another possible explanation is that an excess accumulation of
precedent may ultimately stimulate rather than obviate legislative
history usage. In the short to medium run, the accumulation of
precedent renders the use of legislative history unnecessary by
providing the Justices with an alternative source of guidance as to
a statute’s meaning. As the number of decisions continues to
proliferate, however, the Justices may find themselves increasingly
178. See Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 225 (“As a
statute matures and its original legislative history fades further into the past, the Court may
come to view the detailed pre-enactment record as less relevant, in part because new sources
of authority have arisen to clarify the meaning of the enacted text.... [O]ne such source is
Supreme Court precedent: the Court’s own intervening interpretations may create a baseline
understanding of certain provisions or concepts.”).
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hemmed in by case law that strikes them as unmanageable,
incorrect, or otherwise in need of repair. At that point, legislative
history may constitute a useful tool for overcoming the restraint of
stare decisis, pruning the precedential thicket, or rediscovering the
original meaning of the statute.
Like statutory age, the year in which the opinion was rendered
also had a nonlinear impact on legislative history usage. Once
again, the coefficients on both the regular and squared versions of
the year variable were statistically significant and pointed in
opposite directions. In practical terms, this means that the likeli-
hood of legislative history usage initially rose over time but
eventually began to sink. This is precisely the trend depicted in
Figure 5, which graphs the overall percentage of actual legislative
history usage over time. The results of our regression confirm that
the waxing then waning trend seen in Figure 5 is genuine and does
not simply reflect random fluctuation over time or the impact of
other variables. 
Our estimation of the model also revealed that the Justices were
significantly less likely to cite to legislative history when authoring
dissenting or concurring opinions than when authoring majority
opinions. Holding all other variables at their median values, the
probability that a majority opinion would refer to legislative history
was a relatively healthy 0.66. For dissenting opinions, the probabil-
ity of citation to legislative history was only 0.35, and for concurring
opinions, the probability was lower still, 0.15 for regular concur-
rences, and 0.25 for special concurrences. The fact that majority
opinions were more likely to cite legislative history than minority
opinions supports what we have called the “precedent-crafting
hypothesis”—namely, the hypothesis that authors of majority
opinions make a deliberate effort to “cover all relevant bases,” such
as legislative history, in order to fashion durable and comprehensive
precedent that will “provide adequate guidance to the lower courts”
in future cases.179
Finally, we found no evidence that the Court’s decision in Chevron
has affected the propensity of the Justices to cite legislative history.
The fact that Chevron was not a statistically significant predictor of
179. See supra Part III.B.
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legislative history usage does not prove, however, that the Justices
feel free to disregard precedent when deciding whether to employ
legislative history. First, as previously discussed, it is unclear
whether adherence to the Chevron doctrine ought to result in
greater or lesser use of legislative history.180 Second, not all of the
cases in our data involved agency interpretations of statutes. As a
result, even if Chevron has actually restrained or encouraged
legislative history usage on the Court in those cases where it is
applicable, its effect may have been diluted to the point of statistical
insignificance by the presence in our data of numerous cases in
which Chevron was simply irrelevant. 
2. Ideological Variables
It may come as little surprise to political scientists who study
judicial behavior that ideology also appears to play a significant role
in the decision to use legislative history. A Justice’s personal
ideology, as measured by the Martin-Quinn scores, proved to be a
statistically significant predictor of his or her propensity to use
legislative history. Consistent with what one might intuit from an
examination of Table 4, liberal Justices were significantly more
likely to cite legislative history than conservative ones. Our results
are also consistent with what we have called the ideological
alignment hypothesis: the Justices were more likely to consult
legislative history when they were ideologically in agreement with
the Congress that enacted the statute.181 
What we did not find, however, was evidence that legislative
history usage biases outcomes in a systematic way or leads to more
ideological decision making. First, controlling for such variables as
the ideology of the opinion author, there was no statistically
significant relationship between whether an opinion cited legislative
history and whether the opinion arrived at a liberal or conservative
result. Second, consistent with earlier studies,182 we found no
180. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part III.E.2.
182. See Brudney & Ditslear, Burger and Rehnquist Eras, supra note 48, at 226-27 & tbl.4
(finding that “liberal justices are basically outcome-neutral in their pattern of reliance on
legislative history, although conservative justices are less so”); supra note 99 and
accompanying text. Of course, it is possible to argue, and even to model, reasons that justices
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might turn to one interpretive technique when others prove too constraining. See, e.g.,
Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone
Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 795, 805-09 (2008) (expounding such a model).
183. See Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 122.
evidence that legislative history usage causes or enables the
Justices to reach their ideologically preferred outcomes more often
than they otherwise would. The variable that measures the
interaction between the ideology of the author and the ideological
direction of the opinion was not a statistically significant predictor
of legislative history usage. In substantive terms, this means that
the likelihood that a liberal Justice will arrive at a liberal result, or
that a conservative Justice will reach a conservative result, is the
same regardless of whether he or she happens to cite legislative
history.
The fact that the ideological direction of an opinion was not
correlated with legislative history usage, either on its own or when
interacted with the ideology of the authoring Justice, is open to
different interpretations. On its face, this finding would seem to
directly undermine Justice Scalia’s charge that legislative history
is a tool that judges freely manipulate in order to reach the results
that they favor as an ideological matter.183 We sought, and failed to
find, evidence that Justices use legislative history to reach their
ideologically preferred outcomes. Our pattern of findings suggests
instead that the Justices cite legislative history in the course of
arriving at outcomes that they would reach even if they had not
cited legislative history. Thus, for example, our results tell us that
Justice Stevens is more likely to cite legislative history than Justice
Scalia, and that the difference between the two only increases if the
statute at issue was enacted by a liberal Congress. But our results
also tell us that the likelihood that Justice Stevens will ultimately
arrive at a liberal outcome is the same regardless of whether he
decides to cite legislative history. In other words, although the
decision to cite legislative history is influenced by ideological factors,
there is little to suggest that this decision carries much consequence
for the outcome of the case. 
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to reject conclusively the
argument that the Justices make strategic use of legislative history
in pursuit of ideological goals. To some extent, our null finding
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might reflect problems in the coding of the “ideological direction of
outcome” variable in the Spaeth database, which has come under
some scholarly criticism for mislabeling substantively conservative
outcomes as liberal and vice versa.184 An alternative explanation of
our null finding might be that the Justices resort to, or avoid,
legislative history only when they cannot otherwise reach their
preferred results. Imagine, for example, that liberal Justices
confront two types of cases, those in which they can easily reach
liberal outcomes without resort to legislative history, and those in
which liberal outcomes are difficult to justify without the help of
legislative history. Assume further, and plausibly, that they prefer
not to use legislative history, all other things being equal, because
it requires extra work on their part. A reasonable strategy would
therefore be to refrain from citing legislative history in the first type
of case while relying upon it in the second type of case. If liberal
Justices were to employ such a strategy, they would indeed be
making instrumental, ideologically motivated use of legislative
history. Yet we would observe only that liberal Justices reach liberal
outcomes at roughly the same rate regardless of whether they use
legislative history—just as we have, in fact, observed of our actual
data. In other words, it is possible to fashion an account of strategic
legislative history usage that is consistent with our null finding.
3. The Impact of Justice Scalia
As other scholars have noted, the chronology of events suggests
that Justice Scalia’s appointment may have contributed to the
Court’s eschewal of legislative history in more recent years.185 As
Figure 5 illustrates, overall legislative history usage peaked in the
1970s, after the Warren Court’s revolution in individual rights had
been implemented, but before the retirement of Justices Marshall
and Brennan, both devotees of legislative history usage. The
probability of the use of legislative history was lower before that era
and declined after it, and continues to decline today. 
Our regression analysis suggests, however, that Justice Scalia’s
influence on other members of the Court has been limited or
184. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
185. See sources cited supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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nonexistent. Controlling for the other variables in our model, we
found that his mere presence on the Court did not render it less
likely that other Justices would cite legislative history. In other
words, we looked specifically for evidence of a “Scalia effect,”186 and
we found none. In this respect, our findings contradict the conclu-
sions drawn by other scholars.187 Although Justice Scalia has been
vocally opposed to the use of legislative history, we found no
evidence that he has successfully persuaded others to follow his
lead. Our findings suggest, instead, that any decline in legislative
history usage has more to do with the repeated appointment of
relatively conservative Justices to the Court than the influence of
Justice Scalia.188
On the other hand, our findings do suggest that Justice Scalia’s
personal resistance to the use of legislative history has been more
intense than that of Justices who are otherwise comparably
conservative. Our model included both a special variable indicating
whether Justice Scalia authored the opinion in question, and a
measure of the authoring Justice’s ideology as measured by his
Martin-Quinn score, which is calculated from the votes that Justices
cast on the outcomes of cases. The fact that Justice Scalia’s special
variable was a statistically significant and negative predictor of
legislative history usage, even controlling for his overall conserva-
tism as measured by his Martin-Quinn score, means that Justice
Scalia’s opinions were significantly less likely to cite legislative
history than those authored by similarly conservative Justices. In
fact, the only Justice who was nominally less likely to use legislative
history is a relatively new appointee, Chief Justice Roberts, about
whom statistically meaningful conclusions cannot yet be drawn.
186. See supra Part III.F (setting forth the “Scalia effect” hypothesis).
187. See Brudney & Ditslear, Scalia Effect, supra note 48, at 117-18; Koby, supra note 28,
at 369.
188. See supra tbl.5 and Part VI.B.2 (noting that a Justice’s ideology is a statistically
significant predictor of his or her legislative history usage).
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C. Evaluation of the Relative Impact of Legal and Ideological
Factors
The regression results reported thus far tell us which variables
have a statistically significant impact on legislative history usage.
They do not, however, tell us which of these variables have a greater
practical impact than the others. One way of evaluating their real-
world impact relative to one another is to measure the change in the
predicted probability of legislative history usage when we vary one
variable within a realistic range—say, for example, the actual range
observed in our data—while holding all other variables constant at
a typical level. This is precisely the approach employed above in
Figure 6, which illustrates in graphical terms the impact of statute
age on the predicted probability of legislative history usage when all
other variables are held constant at their median levels. The results
of this approach, extended to all of the other statistically significant
variables in the model, are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7: Impact of Changes in Each Variable on the Predicted
Probability of Legislative History Usage, Holding All Other 
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Statute length: Shortest statute 
(179 words): .61 (.52, .70)
Longest statute
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The variable with the biggest impact on the likelihood of legisla-
tive history usage is opinion type. To establish a baseline for
comparison, let us specify that the statute is typical or average by
holding all of its other characteristics at their median values. Let us
further assume that the author of the opinion is ideologically
moderate, and that he or she is authoring an opinion of the most
common type—namely, a majority opinion. The resulting baseline
scenario is a majority opinion by Justice White interpreting a forty-
seven-year-old statute enacted by an ideologically moderate
Congress that is 14,273 words long and has been amended fifty-five
times. Under these assumptions, the model predicts that an opinion
has a 0.73 probability of citing legislative history. If the same
Justice facing the same statute is authoring a concurrence instead
of a majority opinion, however, the predicted probability of legisla-
tive history usage falls to just 0.20. In other words, the difference
between the probability that a majority opinion will cite legislative
history and the probability that a concurrence will do so is a
whopping 0.53.
The next most important variable is the length of the statute. For
a statute as concise as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which weighs in at just 179
words, the predicted probability of legislative history usage would
fall to just 0.61. At the opposite extreme, that likelihood increases
to 0.85 if the statute is as long as the Internal Revenue Code. That
is, the predicted probability of legislative history usage increases by
0.24 when we move from the shortest statute in our data to the
longest, holding all other variables at their median values. 
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The effect of a statute’s age on the likelihood of legislative history
usage is somewhat harder to describe because it is not linear. As
Figure 6 illustrates, that likelihood reaches its nadir for statutes
that are at approximately the ninety-year mark, but is higher for
statutes that are either older or newer. If we compare a statute that
is ninety years old with one that is newly enacted, our model
predicts that an opinion interpreting the new statute has a 0.87
likelihood of citing legislative history, as opposed to just 0.68 for an
opinion interpreting the older one. Thus, by these calculations, it is
realistic for the age of a statute to affect the probability that an
opinion will cite legislative history by up to 0.19.
The complexity and amendedness of a statute have roughly the
same impact on the predicted probability of legislative history
usage. As noted above in Table 1, the least complex statute in our
data is the Immigration and Nationality Act, which is written at
roughly a tenth-grade reading level,189 whereas the most complex
statute is the Robinson-Patman Act, with a Flesch-Kincaid score
that is effectively off the scale. Holding all other variables at their
median levels, the predicted probability that an opinion interpreting
a statute as simple as the Immigration and Nationality Act will cite
legislative history is 0.64, but that probability increases to 0.82 for
a statute as complex as the Robinson-Patman Act. The effect of
variations in statutory amendedness is similar: an opinion inter-
preting a statute that has never been amended, such as the Jones
Act, has a 0.80 probability of citing legislative history, whereas an
opinion interpreting a statute that has been amended more than ten
thousand times, such as the Internal Revenue Code, has only a 0.63
probability of doing so. Our model and data suggest, in other words,
that real-world variations in statutory complexity and amendedness
can increase or decrease the probability of legislative history usage
by up to 0.18. 
This brings us to the effect of ideology on the use of legislative
history. The use of predicted probabilities enables us to compare the
relative impact of ideological and legal variables in an intuitive
manner. The result may fuel the skepticism of many legal scholars
as to the relative importance of ideology in shaping judicial
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (2006).
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behavior. The model predicts that a Justice with a Martin-Quinn
score as extreme as that of Chief Justice Rehnquist, whose score
identifies him as the most conservative Justice in our data, has a
0.67 probability of citing legislative history, when all other variables
are held at their median values.190 By contrast, a Justice as liberal
as Justice Douglas, the most liberal Justice according to the Martin-
Quinn scores,191 has a 0.81 likelihood of doing so. That is meaning-
fully higher, to be sure, but the 0.14 difference in predicted probabil-
ities between a very conservative Justice and a very liberal Justice
pales next to the impact of other variables such as opinion type or
statute length. Indeed, although the ideology of the authoring
Justice certainly has a sizable impact on legislative history usage,
it has less impact than any of the legal variables discussed above.
Ideology appears to have a slightly more pronounced effect on
legislative history usage, however, when we consider the effect of
ideological alignment between the authoring Justice and the
Congress that enacted the statute at issue. The most extreme values
of our measure of the interaction between author ideology and
legislative ideology both involved opinions by the most liberal
Justice in our data, Justice Douglas: in one case, he interpreted the
Clayton Act, which was passed in 1914 by the most liberal Congress
in our data,192 while in the other, he was faced with the Food and
Drug Act, which was originally enacted in 1906 by a Republican-
controlled Congress.193 Our model predicts that, holding all other
190. As Table 4 suggests, Chief Justice Rehnquist was perhaps unusually willing for a
Justice of his ideological timbre to resort to legislative history. However, it is important to
bear in mind that we are not predicting how Chief Justice Rehnquist in particular would
behave. Rather, we are using the results of our regression model to predict how a Justice with
a Martin-Quinn score as extreme as that of Chief Justice Rehnquist would behave. Accordingly,
the hypothetical comparison being made here between a very conservative Justice and a very
liberal Justice is not swayed by the idiosyncrasies of Chief Justice Rehnquist in a way that
might lead us to understate the practical impact of ideology on the probability of legislative
history usage.
191. Martin & Quinn, supra note 137, at 146.
192. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 691-92 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring).
193. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 612 (1973). If we were
to judge the impact of ideological alignment anecdotally by comparing just these two extreme
cases, we would draw the wrong conclusion, as Justice Douglas did cite legislative history
when faced with the Food and Drug Act but declined to do so when considering the Clayton
Act. The biggest problem with such a primitive comparison is that it does not control for the
sizable difference between majority and concurring opinions: Justice Douglas’s citation to
legislative history occurred in the context of a full-length majority opinion in Weinberger,
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variables at their median values, a difference in ideological
alignment of this magnitude changes the probability of legislative
history usage by 0.19. In other words, the practical impact of a
Justice’s ideological agreement with the enacting legislature on the
probability of legislative history usage appears to be roughly
comparable with that of the statute’s age and complexity. Thus, at
least when it comes to the use of legislative history, it is fair to say
that ideology has a meaningful impact on judicial behavior, but
certainly not to the exclusion of legal factors. On the contrary, law-
related variables appear to have a stronger impact on the whole.
D. Is Legislative History Usage Motivated by Disagreement Among
the Justices?
1. The Outcome-Justifying Hypothesis: The Impact of       
Disagreement on the Merits on Legislative History Usage
There is one question that remains to be explored—namely, to
what extent, if any, do the Justices cite legislative history in order
to respond to the arguments and positions of other Justices? In Part
III, we hypothesized that disagreement over the meaning of a
statute should increase the likelihood of legislative history usage:
when Justices disagree with one another on the merits, we might
expect them to resort to legislative history as a means of bolstering
their own arguments, and undermining those of their opponents. An
initial examination of the Court’s legislative history opinions yields
little support for this hypothesis. Indeed, the opposite would appear
to be the case: opinions for a unanimous Court are significantly
more likely to cite legislative history than other types of opinions.
 
whereas his failure to cite legislative history occurred in the context of a 200-word
concurrence in Gordon. Compare id. at 619 (interpreting the Food and Drug Act, and quoting
the Senate Report), with Gordon, 422 U.S. at 691-92 (Douglas, J., concurring) (concurring in
the majority’s conclusion that the system of fixed commissions charged by the securities
exchanges is immune from antitrust attack under the Clayton Act).
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Table 8: Likelihood of Legislative History Usage
 in Unanimous Versus Nonunanimous Cases
… the Court was
unanimous.
… the Court was
divided.
Number and percentage
of opinions that cited
legislative history 
when …
260 out of 432 
(60.2%)
1222 out of 2663
(45.9%)
Closer examination reveals, however, that this finding is
deceptive. It is a mistake to conclude that unanimity increases
legislative history usage. Rather, the results in Table 8 reflect the
fact that concurrences and dissents are significantly less likely than
majority opinions to cite legislative history, as our regression
analysis revealed. Most majority opinions are unanimous opinions,
and majority opinions—unanimous or otherwise—are more likely to
cite legislative history than are minority opinions. In order to isolate
the effect of substantive disagreement, it is necessary to control for
opinion type and compare only apples with apples: unanimous
opinions must be compared with nonunanimous majority opinions.
Once we do so, we discover that unanimous opinions are no more
likely than nonunanimous majority opinions to cite legislative
history: unanimous majority opinions cited legislative history 61.5%
of the time, whereas nonunanimous majority opinions did so 64.9%
of the time. The difference between the two percentages is not
statistically significant.194 
2. The Tit-for-Tat Hypothesis: The Impact of Legislative History
Usage on Legislative History Usage
It is also important to recognize that the above results tell us only
about whether disagreement over the meaning of a statute prompts
legislative history usage. They shed no light, however, on the
validity of what we have called the tit-for-tat hypothesis: perhaps it
is not disagreement over the meaning of the statute, but rather the
fact that some other member of the Court has made a legislative
194. Statistical significance is determined per a Pearson chi-square test (p = 0.22).
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history argument, that truly motivates the Justices to use legisla-
tive history.195 When one Justice cites legislative history, do other
Justices feel the need or desire to respond in kind with legislative
history arguments of their own? 
Examination of this question poses a methodological challenge.
The reciprocal influence that Justices have upon one another cannot
be analyzed using a regression model because such models presup-
pose unidirectional causation. For example, a regression model that
treats a Justice’s decision to use legislative history as the dependent
variable and statutory complexity and age as the independent
variables embodies the assumption that the length and age of the
statute may influence legislative history usage, but not vice versa.
In this case, the assumption of unidirectional causation is
inarguably correct; the length and age of the statute may influence
a Justice’s decision to use legislative history, but the Justice’s
decision cannot possibly affect the statute’s length or age. By
contrast, consider the hypothesis that Justice X and Justice Y
influence one another: the fact that Justice X chooses to employ
legislative history in a given case increases the likelihood that
Justice Y will do so, and vice versa. In this case, neither Justice’s
behavior can be used in a regression model to predict the other
Justice’s behavior. To do so would violate the assumption of
unidirectional causation upon which all regression models are
based. 
In lieu of a regression model that assumes unidirectional
causation, we can instead look for evidence of something much
simpler, namely correlation. If Justices are more likely to cite
legislative history in a given case when someone else has done so in
the same case, the existence of that correlation lends conditional
support to the hypothesis that legislative history usage is driven, in
part, by interaction among the Justices. The substantive meaning
of such a correlation should not, of course, be overstated. Drawing
causal inferences from correlations is far from foolproof. If it so
happens that all of the Justices in a given case cite legislative
history, that may have more to do with some other variable—say,
the nature of the factual and legal questions presented, or the
195. See supra Part III.D.
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inherent salience of legislative history in that particular case—than
with the fact that each Justice feels the need to fight fire with fire.
Regression models are especially useful because they offer a way of
controlling for other explanations, but they cannot be employed here
because the underlying assumption of unidirectional causation
would be violated. Thus, we are left to fall back upon the simple
approach of looking for statistically significant correlations in the
legislative history usage patterns of the Justices. In addition, logic
compelled us to exclude unanimous cases from the analysis because
it is not possible in such cases to compare the behavior of Justices
who must face a legislative history argument made by another
Justice with that of Justices who face no such argument.
Our findings, reported in Table 9, support our initial hypothesis:
the fact that another Justice has written an opinion citing legisla-
tive history is indeed correlated with a higher likelihood of legisla-
tive history citation. When at least one other Justice has written an
opinion that cites legislative history, the authoring Justice will cite
legislative history 52.3% of the time. Conversely, when none of the
other Justices has cited legislative history in their opinions, the
authoring Justice will cite legislative history only 35.9% of the
time.196 The correlation is even stronger if we set aside majority and
concurring opinions and narrow our focus to dissenting opinions.
When at least one other opinion has cited legislative history,
dissenting opinions cite legislative history nearly half of the time.
By contrast, when no other opinion has cited legislative history,
dissenting opinions cite legislative history only about one-fifth of the
time.197 In other words, dissenting Justices are much more likely to
cite legislative history if someone in the majority has done so than
if no one else has made a legislative history argument. These
findings suggest that Justices are sensitive to the types of argu-
ments made by their colleagues and feel an obligation or desire to
respond in kind, especially when they disagree with one another on
the merits. 
196. The difference is statistically significant at p < 0.01, per a Pearson chi-square test. If
opinions that contain criticism of legislative history usage are excluded from the analysis, the
results remain largely unchanged (52.1% versus 35.6%), and the difference remains
statistically significant at the p < .01 level.
197. The difference is statistically significant at p < 0.001, per a Pearson chi-square test.
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Table 9: Likelihood of Legislative History Usage 
When Another Opinion Has Cited Legislative History
 … no other opinion
cited legislative 
history.
… at least one
other opinion cited
legislative history.
Number and percentage of
opinions that cited 
legislative history when …
375 out of 1045  
(35.9%)
847 out of 1618
(52.3%)




68 out of 321  
(21.2%)
357 out of 722
(49.4%)
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to identify the reasons for which members
of the Supreme Court do, or do not, turn to legislative history when
interpreting statutes. Using various statistical methods, we
explored the impact of a variety of factors, including the formal
characteristics of the statutes being interpreted, the ideological
leanings of the Justices themselves, and, indeed, even whether
Justice Scalia’s mere presence on the Court has discouraged other
Justices from mentioning legislative history. Our results offer
support for what we have called the guidance-seeking, precedent-
crafting, and tit-for-tat hypotheses, all of which suggest that the
Justices are motivated by legal and deliberative factors. The
evidence indicates that Justices tend to cite legislative history when
faced with statutes that are in some objective sense difficult to
interpret, when crafting majority opinions, and when other Justices
have also cited legislative history. 
At the same time, we found evidence that legislative history
usage is influenced by ideological factors, and in more ways than
one. As previous studies have reported, liberal Justices are gener-
ally more inclined than conservative Justices to make use of
legislative history. But we also found evidence of a form of ideologi-
cally motivated, instrumental legislative history usage that no
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previous study has either investigated or documented. Consistent
with what we have called the ideological alignment hypothesis, it
appears that the Justices are more likely to consult legislative
history when it favors their ideologically preferred outcomes: when
a Justice is ideologically aligned with the Congress that enacted the
statute at issue, he or she is more likely to cite the legislative
history of the statute.
We found little support, by contrast, for the outcome-justifying
hypothesis: disagreement over the meaning of a statute does not, by
itself, make it more likely that the Justices will cite legislative
history. Whether another member of the Court has cited legislative
history is a much better predictor of legislative history usage than
whether the Justices disagree with one another over the actual
meaning of the statute. It also appears that legislative history is one
area in which Justice Scalia’s powers of critique exceed his powers
of persuasion: we found no evidence that his vocal objections to
legislative history have caused his fellow Justices to behave any
differently than they would have in his absence. Nor do our findings
suggest that the Court’s decision in Chevron has done anything to
whet or diminish the appetite of the Justices for legislative history.
These findings reveal much about the nature of judicial behavior
and judicial reasoning more generally. They illustrate in an
empirical way that both ideological and legal factors have a
meaningful impact on the choices that judges make about the
interpretive techniques that they will use. Overall, the hermeneutic
choices that the Justices make are not purely technical in nature.
Nor, however, are they simply outgrowths of judicial philosophy or
personal preference. Rather, such choices typify judicial decision
making insofar as they reflect a combination of competing influ-
ences.
The widespread adoption of a theoretical vocabulary that pits the
“legal model” against the “attitudinal model” has perhaps encour-
aged a tendency to view the two ways of explaining judicial behavior
as mutually exclusive.198 But they are not. The notion that judicial
198. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44-97, 279-311 (2002) (defining and contrasting the
“attitudinal” and “legal” models of Supreme Court decision making, and finding “virtually no
evidence for concluding that the Justices’ decisions are based on legal factors”); Frank B.
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Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary
Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 252-53 (1997) (contrasting the attitudinal and legal models,
and arguing that legal scholars have been “remarkably oblivious” to the former while political
scientists have been “correspondingly unconscious” of the latter); Czarnezki & Ford, supra
note 117, at 854 (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra, for the proposition that “[p]olitical scientists
speak of two basic models of judicial behavior: the legal model and the attitudinal model”).
199. See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 83, at 884 (identifying the use of “[m]ore sophisticated
statistical models that include legal factors and legal reasoning as variables” as “perhaps the
greatest priority in continued quantitative examination of the federal judiciary”); Daniel E.
Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement,
and Models 3 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.
edu/research/JudicialBehaviorQuinn.pdf (observing that the supposed conflict between the
legal and attitudinal camps “is overblown, poses a false dichotomy, and has few truly devout
adherents”).
200. See Tamanaha, supra note 85, at 690-98 (arguing that, contrary to the assumptions
of many political scientists, “the legal fraternity” has never subscribed to “the myth of
mechanical jurisprudence” or been “oblivious to the potential influence of personal views on
judging”).
201. If one examines the authorities that law professors cite for the proposition that
political scientists subscribe to the attitudinal model, it becomes apparent that the attitudinal
model is identified closely, if not almost exclusively, with two political scientists in particular,
Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, who are even responsible for popularizing the term
“attitudinal model.” See, e.g., Cross, supra note 198, at 252 & n.3 (asserting that “[p]olitical
scientists, such as Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, employ an ‘attitudinal model,’” and noting
that the term “attitudinal model” first “assumed prominence” thanks to an earlier edition of
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 198); Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 117, at 847 (citing SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 198, for the proposition that “[p]olitical scientists speak of two basic
models of judicial behavior: the legal model and the attitudinal model”); Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1635, 1646-50 (1998) (crediting Harold Spaeth, his coauthor David Rohde, and an earlier
scholar, Glendon Schubert, with the development of the attitudinal model). Yet even Segal
and Spaeth themselves do not claim that Supreme Court decision making is purely the result
of the attitudes of the Justices, but instead conclude that legal factors have an effect, albeit
one that is generally overwhelmed by attitudinal factors. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999) (finding that precedent has a small but discernable influence on
the decisions of the Justices); Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert M. Howard, An Original Look at
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113 (2002) (finding that textual “plain meaning” influences
the voting of conservative Justices). 
behavior is the product of either law or ideology, each to the
exclusion of the other, does not accurately capture mainstream
thought among either political scientists or law professors.199 No
legal scholar today is so naïve as to believe that the behavior of the
Justices is never influenced by either political or ideological
considerations.200 Conversely, no political scientist is so cynical as
to believe that legal materials and legal reasoning exert no influence
whatsoever on the manner in which the Justices decide cases.201 In
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reality, there exists no rigid dichotomy between the way in which
legal scholars explain judicial decision making and the way in which
political scientists do so. What we face, instead, are explanations of
judicial behavior that fall on a continuum and differ more in
emphasis and degree than in kind. 
It is one thing to confirm, as many scholars have long argued,
that law and ideology are both important determinants of judicial
decision making. It is a much greater challenge, however, to assess
the relative importance of the two. Insofar as ideology and law are
incommensurable and abstract phenomena that cannot be placed on
a common measurement scale, it is highly doubtful that there will
ever be a plausible or satisfying way of specifying whether a
particular court or decision was more influenced by law than by
ideology, or vice versa. It is futile to seek simple answers to such
blunt questions. Yet, as Lawrence Baum has suggested, there are
fruitful questions to be asked once we abandon “the model of single-
minded Justices”: “How do justices balance competing goals against
each other? What conditions affect the relative weight of various
goals?”202 Such questions, all of which go to the broader question of
how to locate judges on the law-versus-ideology continuum, belong
at the core of the research agenda for scholars of judicial behavior. 
We hope that this Article helps to lead the way. The hypotheses
identified in this Article invite empirical testing in other contexts
and can provide a common foundation for further research on the
determinants of judicial opinion content, including those of a
nonideological nature. Little is known empirically about the extent
to which judges resort to different devices for the purpose of tackling
inherently difficult questions (the guidance-seeking hypothesis),
crafting precedent that will provide adequate guidance to lower
courts and stand the test of time (the precedent-crafting hypothe-
sis), justifying particular outcomes (the outcome-justifying hypothe-
sis), or fighting fire with fire (the tit-for-tat hypothesis).203 It simply
cannot be assumed that all of the substantive, methodological, and
rhetorical resources available to judges—amicus briefs, dictionaries,
202. Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL.
RES. Q. 749, 761 (1994).
203. See supra Part III (describing the four hypotheses).
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foreign case law, the Federalist Papers,204 and so forth—are used for
the same reasons. Empirical testing of such hypotheses will be
crucial to the development of a systematic and rigorous understand-
ing of judicial reasoning and opinion writing.
204. See Corley et al., supra note 84, at 333, 335-36, 339 (finding on the basis of empirical
analysis that the rate at which Supreme Court Justices cite the Federalist Papers is
heightened by, inter alia, the ideological conservatism of the Justices themselves, the need
to confront “special legitimacy challenges” that arise when the Court is striking down a law
or altering precedent, and the fact that other Justices have cited the Federalist Papers as
well).
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Appendix I:





z-   
statistic
P >| z| 95% confidence
interval
Bulk .128 .032 3.97 0.000 .064 .192
Complexity .602 .149 4.03 0.000 .309 .894
Obscurity -8.32 e-6 .00001 -0.53 0.596 -.00003 .00002
Novelty (first-time
interpretation) -.021 .338 -0.06 0.949 -.685 .642
Amendedness -.090 .037 -2.43 0.015 -.164 -.0177
Age of statute -.028 .006 -4.55 0.000 -.040 -.016
(Age of statute)2 .0002 .00004 3.80 0.000 .00008 .0002
Year of decision .115 .014 7.78 0.000 .086 .144
(Year of decision)2 -.002 .0003 -7.10 0.000 -.003 -.001
Age of statute *
year of decision .0001 .0001 0.83 0.405 -.0002 .0005
(Age of statute *
year of decision)2 -2.88e-08 1.92e-08 -1.50 0.133 -6.65e-08 8.81e-09
Dissent -1.152 .097 -11.84 0.000 -1.343 -.962
Concurrence -2.401 .188 -12.78 0.000 -2.770 -2.033
Special concur-
rence -1.750 .158 -11.11 0.000 -2.06 -1.442
Unanimity -.147 .121 -1.21 0.225 -.385 .091
Author ideology -.068 .031 -2.23 0.026 .-128 -.008
Outcome ideology -.0164 .086 -0.19 0.848 -.184 .151
Author ideology *
outcome ideology -.0258 .040 -0.64 0.521 -.105 .053
Author ideology *
legislative ideology .253 .128 1.97 0.049 .001 .504
Scalia authorship -1.070 .264 -4.05 0.000 -1.589 -.552
Scalia on Court -.245 .222 -1.11 0.269 -.680 .189
Post-Chevron .144 .208 0.69 0.490 -.268 .551
Constant -2.429 .579 -4.20 0.000 -3.564 -1.295
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Appendix III: 
Federal Statutes Most Frequently Interpreted by the 
Supreme Court
Statute Name Citation
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 Id.
Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) provisions of the Social Security
Act, plus amendments
42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.
Age Discrimination in Employment 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules,
or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
11 U.S.C.
Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29
U.S.C. §§ 52-53
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean
Water), plus amendments
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. ch. 8
False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.
Federal Employers’ Liability Act 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
Federal Power Act 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c 
Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2671 et seq.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic, and
related statutes
21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-1611
Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. § 552
Habeas Corpus 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 
Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C.
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Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Act
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. (multiple chapters)
Interstate Commerce Act 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C .)
Jones Act 46 U.S.C. § 30301
Labor-Management Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act
29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
Longshore & Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets,
National Firearms, Organized Crime 
Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or
Gun Control Acts, except for RICO
26 U.S.C. ch. 53; 42 U.S.C. § 3711;
84 Stat. 922; 18 U.S.C. ch. 44
National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.
Natural Gas or Natural Gas Policy Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 717 et seq., 3301 et
seq.
Railway Labor 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
RICO 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
Robinson-Patman Act 15 U.S.C. § 13
Securities Act of 1933; Securities &
 Exchange Act of 1934; Williams Act
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq., 78a et
seq. 
Selective Service, Military Selective 
Service, or Universal Military Service and
Training Acts
40 Stat. 76; 54 Stat. 885; 50 U.S.C.
App. § 450 et seq.
Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 2 et seq.
Social Security, as amended, including So-
cial Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid,
Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to
Families with Dependent Children
42 U.S.C. ch. 7
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Voting Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.

